of one inflicting an insult. Unto hell He sends men against their will, but unto the kingdom
He calls willing minds. To the fire He brings men bound and bewailing themselves: to the
endless state of blessings not so. Else it is a reproach to the very blessings themselves, if their
nature be not such as that men should run to them of their own accord and with many
thanks.
“Whence it is then,” say you, “that all men do not choose them?” From their own infirm-
ity. “And wherefore doth He not cut off their infirmity?” And how tell me—in what
way—ought He to cut it off? Hath He not made a world that teacheth His loving-kindness
and His power? For (Ps. xix. 1.) “the heavens,” saith one, “declare the glory of God.” Hath
He not also sent prophets? Hath He not both called and honored us? Hath He not done
wonders? Hath He not given a law both written and natural? Hath He not sent His Son?
Hath he not commissioned Apostles? Hath He not wrought sins? Hath He not threatened
hell? Hath He not promised the kingdom? Doth He not every day make His sun to rise? Are
not the things which He hath enjoined so simple and easy, that many transcend His com-
mandments in the greatness of their self-denial?13 “What was there to do unto the vineyard
and I have not done it?” (Is. v. 4.)
[10.] “And why,” say you, “did He not make knowledge and virtue natural to us?” Who
speaketh thus? The Greek or the Christian? Both of them, indeed, but not about the same
things: for the one raises his objection with a view to knowledge, the other with a view to
conduct. First, then, we will reply to him who is on our side; for I do not so much regard
those without, as our own members.
9
What then saith the Christian? “It were meet to have implanted in us the knowledge
itself of virtue.” He hath implanted it; for if he had not done so, whence should we have
known what things are to be done, what left undone? Whence are the laws and the tribunals?
But “God should have imparted not [merely] knowledge, but also the very doing of it [vir-
tue].” For what then wouldest thou have to be rewarded, if the whole were of God? For tell
me, doth God punish in the same manner thee and the Greek upon committing sin14? Surely
13 [τῆ περιουσία τῆς φιλοσοφιας. Lit. “by the excess of philosophy.” The term philosophy came to be used
by the early Christian writers to denote a contemplative, self-denying life. The reference in the text is to the so-
called “counsels of perfection,” such as voluntary poverty, voluntary celibacy, etc., which as they exceed what is
enjoined in the Gospel were supposed to establish a peculiar merit and secure a higher degree of blessedness.
This two-fold standard of moral excellence may be traced back as far as the middle of the second century. See
Pastor Hermae Simil. v. 3. C.]
14 The meaning seems to be, “Whatever other sins you commit, you have not the sin of unbelief to answer
for; and would, I suppose, think it hard, if cæteris paribus you were counted as guilty as an unbeliever. Now this
your instinctive judgment confutes any hope you may have that nature and circumstances may excuse you in
any other sin.”
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Homily II