all thought and is far removed from all that we observe within ourselves, proceeds in its
existence in a very different manner to what we do in this present life. Man, possessing a
constitution whose law it is to be moving, is carried in that particular direction whither the
impulse of his will directs: and so his soul is not affected in the same way towards what lies
before it1834, as one may say, as to what it has left behind; for hope leads the forward
movement, but it is memory that succeeds that movement when it has advanced to the at-
tainment of the hope; and if it is to something intrinsically good that hope thus leads on the
soul, the print that this exercise of the will leaves upon the memory is a bright one; but if
hope has seduced the soul with some phantom only of the Good, and the excellent Way has
been missed, then the memory that succeeds what has happened becomes shame, and an
intestine war is thus waged in the soul between memory and hope, because the last has been
such a bad leader of the will. Such in fact is the state of mind that shame gives expression
to; the soul is stung as it were at the result; its remorse for its ill-considered attempt is a whip
that makes it feel to the quick, and it would bring in oblivion to its aid against its tormentor.
Now in our case nature, owing to its being indigent of the Good, is aiming always at this
which is still wanting to it, and this aiming at a still missing thing is this very habit of Desire,
which our constitution displays equally, whether it is baulked of the real Good, or wins that
which it is good to win. But a nature that surpasses every idea that we can form of the Good
and transcends all other power, being in no want of anything that can be regarded as good,
is itself the plenitude of every good; it does not move in the sphere of the good by way of
participation in it only, but it is itself the substance of the Good (whatever we imagine the
Good to be); it neither gives scope for any rising hope (for hope manifests activity in the
direction of something absent; but “what a man has, why doth he yet hope for?” as the
449
Apostle asks), nor is it in want of the activity of the memory for the knowledge of things;
that which is actually seen has no need of being remembered. Since, then, this Divine nature
is beyond any particular good1835, and to the good the good is an object of love, it follows
that when It looks within Itself1836, It wishes for what It contains and contains that which
It wishes, and admits nothing external. Indeed there is nothing external to It, with the sole
exception of evil, which, strange as it may seem to say, possesses an existence in not existing
at all. For there is no other origin of evil except the negation of the existent, and the truly-
existent forms the substance of the Good. That therefore which is not to be found in the
existent must be in the non-existent. Whenever the soul, then, having divested itself of the
1834 κατὰ το ἔμπροσθεν αὐτῆς.
1835 any particular good, not as Oehler, “jenseits alles Guten.” The Divine Being is the complement, not the
negation, of each single good.
1836 ἐν ἑαυτῇ βλέπουσα. But Augentius and Sifanus seem to have read ἑαυτὴν: and this is supported by three
Codd.
835
On the Soul and the Resurrection.