Chapter IX.—On the Different Kinds of Cause.
Of Causes, some are Procatarctic and some Synectic, some
Co-operating, some Causes
sine quâ non.
Those that afford the occasion of the origin of anything
first, are Procatarctic; as beauty is the cause of love to the
licentious; for when seen by them, it alone produces the amorous
inclination, but not necessarily.
Causes are Synectic (which are also univocally perfect
of themselves) whenever a cause is capable of producing the effect of
itself, independently.
Now all the causes may be shown in order in the case of
the learner. The father is the Procatarctic cause of learning, the
teacher the Synectic, and the nature of the learner the cooperating
cause, and time holds the relation of the Cause
sine quâ
non.
Now that is properly called a cause which is capable of
effecting anything actively; since we say that steel is capable of
cutting, not merely while cutting, but also while not cutting. Thus,
then, the capability of causing (
τὸ παρεκτικόν
)
signifies both; both that which is now acting, and that which is not
yet acting, but which possesses the power of acting.
Some, then, say that causes are properties of bodies;
and others of incorporeal substances; others say that the body is
properly speaking cause, and that what is incorporeal is so only
catachrestically, and a quasi-cause. Others, again, reverse matters,
saying that corporeal substances are properly causes, and bodies are so
improperly; as, for example, that cutting, which is an action, is
incorporeal, and is the cause of cutting which is an action and
incorporeal, and, in the case of bodies, of being cut,—as in the
case of the sword and what is cut [by it].
The cause of things is predicated in a threefold manner.
One, What the cause is, as the statuary; a second, Of what it is the
cause of becoming, a statue; and a third, To what it is the cause, as,
for example, the material: for he is the cause to the brass of becoming
a statue. The being produced, and the being cut, which are causes to
what they belong, being actions, are incorporeal.
According to which principle, causes belong to the class
of predicates (
κατηγορημάτων
),
or, as others say, of
dicta
(
λεκτῶν
)
(for Cleanthes and Archedemus call predicates
dicta
); or rather,
some causes will be assigned to the class of predicates, as that which
is cut, whose case is to be cut; and some to that of axioms,—as,
for example, that of a ship being made, whose case again is, that a
ship is constructing. Now Aristotle denominates the name of such things
as a house, a ship, burning, cutting, an appellative. But the case is
allowed to be incorporeal. Therefore that sophism is solved thus: What
you say passes through your mouth. Which is true. You name a house.
Therefore a house passes through your mouth. Which is false. For we do
not speak the house, which is a body, but the case, in which the house
is, which is incorporeal.
And we say that the house-builder builds the house, in
reference to that which is to be produced. So we say that the cloak is
woven; for that which makes is the indication of the operation. That
which makes is not the attribute of one, and the cause that of another,
but of the same, both in the case of the cloak and of the house. For,
in as far as one is the cause of anything being produced, in so far is
he also the maker of it. Consequently, the cause, and that which makes,
and that through which (
δἰ ὅ
), are the
same. Now, if anything is “a cause” and “that which
effects,” it is certainly also “that through which.”
But if a thing is “that through which,” it does not by any
means follow that it is also “the cause.” Many things, for
instance, concur in one result, through which the end is reached; but
all are not causes. For Medea would not have killed her children, had
she not been enraged. Nor would she have been enraged, had she not been
jealous. Nor would she have been this, if she had not loved. Nor would
she have loved, had not Jason sailed to Colchi. Nor would this have
taken place, had the Argo not been built. Nor would this have taken
place, had not the timbers been cut from Pelion. For though in all
these things there is the case of “that through which,”
they are not all “causes” of the murder of the children,
but only Medea was the cause. Wherefore, that which does not hinder
does not act. Wherefore, that which does not hinder is not a cause, but
that which hinders is. For it is in acting and doing something that the
cause is conceived.
Besides, what does not hinder is separated from what
takes place; but the cause is related to the event. That, therefore,
which does not hinder cannot be a cause. Wherefore, then, it is
accomplished, because that which can hinder is not present. Causation
is then predicated in four ways: The efficient cause, as the statuary;
and the material, as the brass; and the form, as the character; and the
end, as the honour of the Gymnasiarch.
The relation of the cause
sine quâ
non
is held by the brass in reference to the production of the statue;
and likewise it is a [true] cause. For
everything without which the effect
is incapable of being produced, is of necessity a cause; but a cause not
absolutely. For the cause
sine quâ non
is not Synectic, but
Co-operative. And everything that acts produces the effect, in conjunction
with the aptitude of that which is acted on. For the cause disposes. But
each thing is affected according to its natural constitution; the aptitude
being causative, and occupying the place of causes
sine quâ
non
. Accordingly, the cause is inefficacious without the aptitude;
and is not a cause, but a co-efficient. For all causation is conceived in
action. Now the earth could not make itself, so that it could not be the
cause of itself. And it were ridiculous to say that the fire was not the
cause of the burning, but the logs,—or the sword of the cutting,
but the flesh,—or the strength of the antagonist the cause of the
athlete being vanquished, but his own weakness.
The Synectic cause does not require time. For the
cautery produces pain at the instant of its application to the flesh.
Of Procatarctic causes, some require time till the effect be produced,
and others do not require it, as the case of fracture.
Are not these called independent of time, not by way of
privation, but of diminution, as that which is sudden, not that which
has taken place without time?
Every cause, apprehended by the mind as a cause, is
occupied with something, and is conceived in relation to something;
that is, some effect, as the sword for cutting; and to some object, as
possessing an aptitude, as the fire to the wood. For it will not burn
steel. The cause belongs to the things which have relation to
something. For it is conceived in its relation to another thing. So
that we apply our minds to the two, that we may conceive the cause as a
cause.
The same relation holds with the creator, and maker, and
father. A thing is not the cause of itself. Nor is one his own father.
For so the first would become the second. Now the cause acts and
affects. That which is produced by the cause is acted on and is
affected. But the same thing taken by itself cannot both act and be
affected, nor can one be son and father. And otherwise the cause
precedes in being what is done by it, as the sword, the cutting. And
the same thing cannot precede at the same instant as to matter, as it
is a cause, and at the same time, also, be after and posterior as the
effect of a cause.
Now
being
differs from
becoming
, as
the cause from the effect, the father from the son. For the same thing
cannot both
be
and
become
at the same instant; and
consequently it is not the cause of itself. Things are not causes of
one another, but causes to each other. For the splenetic affection
preceding is not the cause of fever, but of the occurrence of fever;
and the fever which precedes is not the cause of spleen, but of the
affection increasing.
Thus also the virtues are causes to each other, because
on account of their mutual correspondence they cannot be separated. And
the stones in the arch are causes of its continuing in this category,
but are not the causes of one another. And the teacher and the learner
are to one another causes of progressing as respects the predicate.
And mutual and reciprocal causes are predicated, some of
the same things, as the merchant and the retailer are causes of gain;
and sometimes one of one thing and others of another, as the sword and
the flesh; for the one is the cause to the flesh of being cut, and the
flesh to the sword of cutting. [It is well said,] “An eye for an
eye, life for life.” For he who has wounded another mortally, is
the cause to him of death, or of the occurrence of death. But on being
mortally wounded by him in turn, he has had him as a cause in turn, not
in respect of being a cause to him, but in another respect. For he
becomes the cause of death to him, not that it was death returned the
mortal stroke, but the wounded man himself. So that he was the cause of
one thing, and had another cause. And he who has done wrong becomes the
cause to another, to him who has been wronged. But the law which
enjoins punishment to be inflicted is the cause not of injury, but to
the one of retribution, to the other of discipline. So that the things
which are causes, are not causes to each other as causes.
It is still asked, if many things in conjunction become
many causes of one thing. For the men who pull together are the causes
of the ship being drawn down; but along with others, unless what is a
joint cause be a cause.
Others say, if there are many causes, each by itself
becomes the cause of one thing. For instance, the virtues, which are
many, are causes of happiness, which is one; and of warmth and pain,
similarly, the causes are many. Are not, then, the many virtues one in
power, and the sources of warmth and of pain so, also? and does not the
multitude of the virtues, being one in kind, become the cause of the
one result, happiness?
But, in truth, Procatarctic causes are more than one
both generically and specifically; as, for example, cold, weakness,
fatigue, dyspepsia, drunkenness, generically, of any disease; and
specifically, of fever. But Synectic causes are so, generically alone,
and not also specifically.
For of pleasant odour, which is one thing genetically,
there are many specific causes, as
frankincense, rose, crocus, styrax, myrrh, ointment. For
the rose has not the same kind of sweet fragrance as myrrh.
And the same thing becomes the cause of contrary
effects; sometimes through the magnitude of the cause and its power,
and sometimes in consequence of the susceptibility of that on which it
acts. According to the nature of the force, the same string, according
to its tension or relaxation, gives a shrill or deep sound. And honey
is sweet to those who are well, and bitter to those who are in fever,
according to the state of susceptibility of those who are affected. And
one and the same wine inclines some to rage, and others to merriment.
And the same sun melts wax and hardens clay.
Further, of causes, some are apparent; others are
grasped by a process of reasoning; others are occult; others are
inferred analogically.
And of causes that are occult, some are occult
temporarily, being hidden at one time, and at another again seen
clearly; and some are occult by nature, and capable of becoming at no
time visible. And of those who are so by nature, some are capable of
being apprehended; and these some would not call occult, being
apprehended by analogy, through the medium of signs, as, for example,
the symmetry of the passages of the senses, which are contemplated by
reason. And some are not capable of being apprehended; which cannot in
any mode fall under apprehension; which are by their very definition
occult.
Now some are Procatarctic, some Synectic, some
Joint-causes, some Co-operating causes. And there are some according to
nature, some beyond nature. And there are some of disease and by
accident, some of sensations, some of the greatness of these, some of
times and of seasons.
Procatarctic causes being removed, the effect remains.
But a Synectic cause is that, which being present, the effect remains,
and being removed, the effect is removed.
The Synectic is also called by the synonymous expression
“perfect in itself.” Since it is of itself sufficient to
produce the effect.
And if the cause manifests an operation sufficient in
itself, the co-operating cause indicates assistance and service along
with the other. If, accordingly, it effects nothing, it will not be
called even a co-operating cause; and if it does effect something, it
is wholly the cause of this, that is, of what is produced by it. That
is, then, a co-operating cause, which being present, the effect was
produced—the visible visibly, and the occult invisibly.
The Joint-cause belongs also to the genus of causes, as
a fellow-soldier is a soldier, and as a fellow-youth is a youth.
The Co-operating cause further aids the Synectic, in the
way of intensifying what is produced by it. But the Joint-cause does
not fall under the same notion. For a thing may be a Joint-cause,
though it be not a Synectic cause. For the Joint-cause is conceived in
conjunction with another, which is not capable of producing the effect
by itself, being a cause along with a cause. And the Co-operating cause
differs from the Joint-cause in this particular, that the Joint-cause
produces the effect in that which by itself does not act. But the
Co-operating cause, while effecting nothing by itself, yet by its
accession to that which acts by itself, co-operates with it, in order
to the production of the effect in the intensest degree. But especially
is that which becomes co-operating from being Procatarctic, effective
in intensifying the force of the cause.
3710
3710
[The book reaches no conclusion,
and is evidently a fragment, merely. See
Elucidation
II.
; also Kaye, p. 224.]