Chapter LXVIII.
Celsus, however, says that it is only “the course of mortal things which, according to
the appointed cycles, must always be the same in the past, present, and future;” whereas the
majority of the Stoics maintain that this is the case not only with the course of mortal, but
also with that of immortal things, and of those whom they regard as gods. For after the
conflagration of the world, 3971 which has taken place countless times in the past, and will
happen countless times in the future, there has been, and will be, the same arrangement of
all things from the beginning to the end. The Stoics, indeed, in endeavouring to parry, I
don’t know how, the objections raised to their views, allege that as cycle after cycle returns,
all men will be altogether unchanged 3972 from those who lived in former cycles; so that
Socrates will not live again, but one altogether like to Socrates, who will marry a wife exactly
like Xanthippe, and will be accused by men exactly like Anytus and Melitus. I do not under-
stand, however, how the world is to be always the same, and one individual not different
from another, and yet the things in it not the same, though exactly alike. But the main ar-
528
gument in answer to the statements of Celsus and of the Stoics will be more appropriately
investigated elsewhere, since on the present occasion it is not consistent with the purpose
we have in view to expatiate on these points.
3971 τοῦ παντός.
3972 ἀπαραλλάκτους.
Chapter LXVIII
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Chapter LXVIII