§15. He does wrong in making the being of the Father alone proper and supreme, implying
by his omission of the Son and the Spirit that theirs is improperly spoken of, and is inferior.
But at all events he will allow that this supremacy of being betokens no excess of power,
or of goodness, or of anything of that kind. Every one knows that, not to mention those
whose knowledge is supposed to be very profound; viz., that the personality of the Only-
begotten and of the Holy Ghost has nothing lacking in the way of perfect goodness, perfect
power, and of every quality like that. Good, as long as it is incapable of its opposite, has no
bounds to its goodness: its opposite alone can circumscribe it, as we may see by particular
examples. Strength is stopped only when weakness seizes it; life is limited by death alone;
darkness is the ending of light: in a word, every good is checked by its opposite, and by that
alone. If then he supposes that the nature of the Only-begotten and of the Spirit can change
for the worse, then he plainly diminishes the conception of their goodness, making them
capable of being associated with their opposites. But if the Divine and unalterable nature is
incapable of degeneracy, as even our foes allow, we must regard it as absolutely unlimited
in its goodness: and the unlimited is the same as the infinite. But to suppose excess and defect
in the infinite and unlimited is to the last degree unreasonable: for how can the idea of in-
finitude remain, if we posited increase and loss in it? We get the idea of excess only by a
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comparison of limits: where there is no limit, we cannot think of any excess. Perhaps, how-
ever, this was not what he was driving at, but he assigns this superiority only by the
prerogative of priority in time, and, with this idea only, declares the Father’s being to be
alone the supreme one. Then he must tell us on what grounds he has measured out more
length of life to the Father, while no distinctions of time whatever have been previously
conceived of in the personality of the Son.
And yet supposing for a moment, for the sake of argument, that this was so, what su-
periority does the being which is prior in time have over that which follows, on the score
of pure being, that he can say that the one is supreme and proper, and the other is not? For
while the lifetime of the elder as compared with the younger is longer, yet his being has
neither increase nor decrease on that account. This will be clear by an illustration. What
disadvantage, on the score of being, as compared with Abraham, had David who lived
fourteen generations after? Was any change, so far as humanity goes, effected in the latter?
Was he less a human being, because he was later in time? Who would be so foolish as to
assert this? The definition of their being is the same for both: the lapse of time does not
change it. No one would assert that the one was more a man for being first in time, and the
other less because he sojourned in life later; as if humanity had been exhausted on the first,
or as if time had spent its chief power upon the deceased. For it is not in the power of time
to define for each one the measures of nature, but nature abides self-contained, preserving
herself through succeeding generations: and time has a course of its own, whether surround-
ing, or flowing by, this nature, which remains firm and motionless within her own limits.
He does wrong in making the being of the Father alone proper and supreme, implying by his omission of the Son and the Spirit that theirs is improperly spoken of, and is inferior.
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He does wrong in making the being of the Father alone proper and supreme,…