The natural dictate of reason shows, that where there is an effect, there is a cause, and a
cause sufficient for the effect; because, if it were not sufficient, it would not be effectual; and
that therefore, where there is a stated prevalence of the effect, there is a stated prevalence
in the cause. A steady effect argues a steady cause. We obtain a notion of tendency, no other
way than by observation: and we can observe nothing but events: and it is the commonness
or constancy of events, that gives us a notion of tendency in all cases. Thus we judge of
tendencies in the natural world. Thus we judge of the tendencies or propensities of nature
in minerals, vegetables, animals, rational and irrational creatures. A notion of a stated
tendency, or fixed propensity, is not obtained by observing only a single event. A stated
preponderation in the cause or occasion, is argued only by a stated prevalence of the effect.
If a die be once thrown, and it falls on a particular side, we do not argue from hence, that
that side is the heaviest; but if it be thrown without skill or care, many thousands or millions
of times, and it constantly falls on the same side, we have not the least doubt in our minds,
but that there is something of propensity in the case, by superior weight of that side, or in
some other respect. How ridiculous would he make himself, who should earnestly dispute
against any tendency in the state of things to cold in the winter, or heat in the summer; or
should stand to it, that although it often happened that water quenched fire, yet there was
no tendency in it to such an effect!
In the case we are upon, human nature, as existing in such an immense diversity of
persons and circumstances, and never failing in any one instance of coming to that issue—that
sinfulness, which implies extreme misery and eternal ruin—is as the die often cast. For it
alters not the case in the least, as to the evidence of tendency, whether the subject of the
constant event be an individual, or a nature and kind. Thus, if there be a succession of trees
of the same sort, proceeding one from another, from the beginning of the world, growing
in all countries, soils, and climates, all bearing ill fruit; it as much proves the nature and
tendency of the kind, as if it were only one individual tree, that had remained from the be-
ginning of the world, often transplanted into different soils, and had continued to bear only
bad fruit. So, if there were a particular family, which, from generation to generation, and
through every remove to innumerable different countries, and places of abode, all died of
a consumption, or all run distracted, or all murdered themselves, it would be as much an
evidence of the tendency of something in the nature or constitution of that race, as it would
be of the tendency of something in the nature or state of an individual, if some one person
had lived all that time, and some remarkable event had often appeared in him, which he
had been the agent or subject of from year to year, and from age to age, continually and
without fail. 6
6 Here may be observed the weakness of that objection, made against the validity of the argument for a fixed
propensity to sin, from the constancy and universality of the event, that Adam sinned in one instance, without
a fixed propensity. Without doubt a single event is an evidence, that there was some cause or occasion of that
944
SECTION II. Universal sin proves a sinful propensity.