Concerning sins first Entrance into the world.
The things which have already been offered, may serve to obviate or clear many of the
objections which might be raised concerning sin’s first coming into the world; as though it
would follow from the doctrine maintained, that God must be the author of the first sin,
through his so disposing things, that it should necessarily follow from his permission, that
the sinful act should be committed, &c. I need not, therefore, stand to repeat what has been
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said already, about such a necessity not proving God to be the author of sin, in any ill sense,
or in any such sense as to infringe any liberty of man, concerned in his moral agency, or
capacity of blame, guilt, and punishment.
But, should it nevertheless be said, that if God, when he had made roan, might so order
his circumstances, that from these, together with his withholding further assistance and divine
influence, his sin would infallibly follow, why might not God as well have first made man
with a fixed prevailing principle of sin in his heart?
I answer, 1. It was meet, if sin did come into existence, and appear in the world, it should
arise from the imperfection which properly belongs to a creature, as such, and should appear
so to do, that it might appear not to be from God as the efficient or fountain. But this could
not have been, if man had been made at first with sin in his heart; nor unless the abiding
principle and habit of sin were first introduced by an evil act of the creature. If sin had not
arisen from the imperfection of the creature, it would not have been so visible, that it did
not arise from God, as the positive cause, and real source of it.—But it would require room
that cannot be here allowed, fully to consider all the difficulties which have been started,
concerning the first Entrance of sin into the world.—And therefore,
2. I would observe, that objections against the doctrine that has been laid down, in op-
position to the Arminian notion of liberty, from these difficulties, are altogether impertinent;
because no additional difficulty is incurred, by adhering to a scheme in this manner differing
from theirs, and none would be removed or avoided, by agreeing with, and maintaining
theirs. Nothing that the Arminians say, about the contingency or self-determining power
of man’s Will, can serve to explain, with less difficulty, how the first sinful volition of mankind
could take place, and man he justly charged with the blame of it. To say, the Will was self-
determined, or determined by free choice, in that sinful volition—which is to say, that the
first sinful volition was determined by a foregoing sinful volition—is no solution of the
difficulty. It is an odd way of solving difficulties, to advance greater, in order to it. To say,
two and two make nine, or, that a child begat his rather, solves no difficulty: no more does
it, to say, the first sinful act of choice was before the first sinful act of choice, and chose and
determined it, and brought it to pass. Nor is it any better solution, to say, the first sinful
volition chose, determined, and produced itself; which is to say, it was before it was. Nor
will it go any further towards helping us over the difficulty, to say, the first sinful volition
arose accidentally, without any cause at all; any more than it will solve that difficult question,
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SECTION X. Concerning sin's first Entrance into the world.