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Technische verwerking bevestigt geen inhoudelijke beoordeling of toestemming voor openbare publicatie.

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But those are a precarious sort of demonstrations, which men build on the meaning 61 that they arbitrarily affix to a word; especially when that meaning is abstruse, inconsistent, and entirely diverse from the original sense of the word in common speech. That the meaning of the word Action, as Mr. Chubb and many others use it, is utterly unintelligible and inconsistent, is manifest, because it belongs to their notion of an Action, that it is something wherein is no passion or passiveness; that is, (according to their sense of passiveness,) it is under the power, influence, or Action of no cause. And this implies, that Action has no cause, and is no effect; for to be an effect implies passiveness, or the being subject to the power and Action of its cause. And yet they hold, that the mind’s Action is the effect of its own determination, yea, the mind’s free and voluntary determination; which is the same with free choice. So that Action is the effect of something preceding, even a preceding act of choice: and consequently, in this effect the mind is passive, subject to the power and Action of the preceding cause, which is the foregoing choice, and therefore cannot be active. So that here we have this contradiction, that Action is always the effect of foregoing choice, and therefore cannot be Action; because it is passive to the power of that preceding causal choice; and the mind cannot be active and passive in the same thing, at the same time. Again they say, necessity is utterly inconsistent with Action, and a necessary Action is a contradiction; and so their notion of Action implies contingence, and excludes all necessity. And therefore, their notion of Action implies, that it has no necessary depend- ence on, or connexion with, any thing foregoing; for such a dependence or connexion ex- cludes contingence, and implies necessity. And yet their notion of Action implies necessity, and supposes that it is necessary, and cannot he contingent. For they suppose, that whatever is properly called Action, must be determined by the Will and free choice; and this is as If the Supreme Being is the only proper agent in the universe, either moral agency is no proper agency, or else man is not a moral agent; and if so, his is not accountable, and has no concern in religion or morals. Besides, if God be the only proper agent in the universe, how come there to exist evil deeds? God’s agency is good, else we have no evidence that he is a good being; but there are in the world evil deeds proceeding from evil minds, which common sense and universal consent allow, and the nature of the thing proves, to be properly evil agencies; consequently man is an agent, a moral agent, properly so called. 12. If there be no proper agent in the universe but the supreme Being, there is no evil in the nature of bad volitions, but only in their effects. Sin, on that sup- position, is not bad in its own nature, but only injurious in it effects on the sinner. Sin is not to be hated, it seems, on its own account, as odious, but only shunned as dangerous. But as this must arise, according to the system of its abettors, from a sovereign appointment, it follows, that millions of beings are by this very appointment, doomed to the greatest sufferings in the universe, for that in which they had no proper agency—no possible al- ternative! Where is equity, of benevolence? The only clue out of this labyrinth, and out of many others formed by writers on human agency, is, we are fully persuaded , a right view of passive power, in its nature, origin, and tendency, in conjunction with a morally or hypothetically free choice. W. 684 SECTION II. The Falseness and Inconsistence of that metaphysical notion…

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