354 ON THE TRINITY. [BOOK XIV.
coupled together by love, as by a tbird, which is nothing else
than will, seeking or holding fast the enjoyment of something.
We held, therefore, that a trinity of the mind is to be intimated
also by these three terms, memory, intelligence, will.
9. But since the mind, as we said near the end of the same
tenth book, always remembers itself, and always understands
and loves itself, although it does not always think of itself as
distinguished from those things which are not itself ; we must
inquire in what way understanding belongs to thought, while
the knowledge of each thing that is in the mind, even when
one is not thinking of it, is said to belong only to the memory.
For if this is so, then the mind had not then these three
things, viz. to remember, and to understand, and to love itself
;
but it only remembered itself, and afterwards, when it began
to think of itself, then it understood and loved itself.
Chap. vii.—The tidng is made plain by an example. In what way the matter
is handled in order to help the reader.
Wherefore let us consider more carefully that example
which we have adduced, wherein it was shown that not know-
ing a thing is different from not thinking of it ; and that it
may so happen that a man knows something of which he is
not thinking, when he is thinking of something else, not of
that. When any one, then, who is skilled in two or more
branches of knowledge is thinking of one of them, though he
is not thinking of the other or others, yet he knows them.
But can we rightly say. This musician certainly knows music,
but, he does not now understand it, because he is not thinking
of it ; but he does now.understand geometry, for of that he
is now thinking ? Such an assertion, as far as appears, is
absurd. What, again, if we were to say. This musician cer-
tainly knows music, but he does not now love it, while he
is not now thinking of it ; but he does now love geometry,
because of that he is now thinking;—is not this similarly
absurd ? But we say quite correctly. This person whom you
perceive disputing about geometry is also a perfect musician,
for he both remembers music, and understands and loves it
;
but although he both knows and loves it, he is not now
thinking of it, since he is thinking of geometry, of which he
is disputing. ^ And hence we are warned that we have a