all things considered, there is a foundation for the certainty of their existence; or when in
the most general and universal view of things, the subject and predicate of the proposition,
which affirms its existence, would appear with an infallible connexion.
An event, or the existence of a thing, may be said to be necessary with a particular Ne-
cessity, when nothing that can be taken into consideration, in or about a person, thing, or
time, alters the case at all, as to the certainty of an event, or the existence of a thing; or can
be of any account at all, in determining the infallibility of the connexion of the subject and
predicate in the proposition which affirms the existence of the thing; so that it is all one, as
to that person, or thing, at least, at that time, as if the existence were necessary with a Neces-
sity that is most universal and absolute. Thus there are many things that happen to particular
persons, in the existence of which no will of theirs has any concern, at least, at that time;
which, whether they are necessary or not, with regard to things in general, yet are necessary
to them, and with regard to any volition of theirs at that time; as they prevent all acts of the
will about the affair.—I shall have occasion to apply this observation to particular instances
in the following discourse.—Whether the same things that are necessary with a particular
Necessity, be not also necessary with a general Necessity, may be a matter of future consid-
eration. Let that be as it will, it alters not the case, as to the use of this distinction of the kinds
of Necessity.
These things may he sufficient for the explaining of the terms necessary and Necessity,
as terms of art, and as often used by metaphysicians, and controversial writers in divinity,
in a sense diverse from, and more extensive than, their original meaning, in common lan-
guage, which was before explained.
What has been said to show the meaning of the terms necessary and necessity, may be
sufficient for the explaining of the opposite terms, impossible and impossibility. For there is
no difference, but only the latter are negative, and the former positive. Impossibility is the
same as negative Necessity, or a Necessity that a thing should not be. And it is used as a term
of art in a like diversity from the original and vulgar meaning, with Necessity.
The same may be observed concerning the words unable and Inability. It has been ob-
served, that these terms, in their original and common use, have relation to will and endeavor,
as supposable in the case, and as insufficient for the bringing to pass the thing willed and
endeavored. But as these terms are often used by philosophers and divines, especially writers
on controversies about Free Will, they are used in a quite different and far more extensive
sense, and are applied to many cases wherein no will or endeavor for the bringing of the
thing to pass is or can be supposed.
As the words necessary, impossible, unable, &c. are used by polemic writers, in a sense
diverse from their common signification, the like has happened to the term contingent. Any
thing is said to be contingent, or to come to pass by chance or accident, in the original
meaning of such words, when its connexion with its causes or antecedents, according to the
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SECTION III. Concerning the meaning of the terms, Necessity, Impossibility,…