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Translated from Latin of Rufinus.
Chapter I.—On the Freedom of the Will. 2275
1. Some such opinions, we believe, ought to be entertained regarding the divine
promises, when we direct our understanding to the contemplation of that eternal and infinite
world, and gaze on its ineffable joy and blessedness. But as the preaching of the Church
includes a belief in a future and just judgment of God, which belief incites and persuades
men to a good and virtuous life, and to an avoidance of sin by all possible means; and as by
this it is undoubtedly indicated that it is within our own power to devote ourselves either
to a life that is worthy of praise, or to one that is worthy of censure, I therefore deem it ne-
cessary to say a few words regarding the freedom of the will, seeing that this topic has been
treated by very many writers in no mean style. And that we may ascertain more easily what
is the freedom of the will, let us inquire into the nature of will and of desire. 2276
2. Of all things which move, some have the cause of their motion within themselves,
others receive it from without: and all those things only are moved from without which are
without life, as stones, and pieces of wood, and whatever things are of such a nature as to
be held together by the constitution of their matter alone, or of their bodily substance. 2277
That view must indeed be dismissed which would regard the dissolution of bodies by cor-
ruption as motion, for it has no bearing upon our present purpose. Others, again, have the
cause of motion in themselves, as animals, or trees, and all things which are held together
by natural life or soul; among which some think ought to be classed the veins of metals.
Fire, also, is supposed to be the cause of its own motion, and perhaps also springs of water.
And of those things which have the causes of their motion in themselves, some are said to
be moved out of themselves, others by themselves. And they so distinguish them, because
those things are moved out of themselves which are alive indeed, but have no soul; 2278
whereas those things which have a soul are moved by themselves, when a phantasy, 2279 i.e.,
a desire or incitement, is presented to them, which excites them to move towards something.
Finally, in certain things endowed with a soul, there is such a phantasy, i.e., a will or feeling,
2280 as by a kind of natural instinct calls them forth, and arouses them to orderly and regular
2275 The whole of this chapter has been preserved in the original Greek, which is literally translated in cor-
responding portions on each page, so that the differences between Origen’s own words and amplifications and
alterations of the paraphrase of Rufinus may be at once patent to the reader.
2276 Natura ipsius arbitrii voluntatisque.
2277 Quæcunque hujusmodi sunt, quæ solo habitu materiæ suæ vel corporum constant.
2278 Non tamen animantia sunt.
2279 Phantasia.
2280 Voluntas vel sensus.
Chapter I. translated from the Latin of Rufinus: On the Freedom of the Will.
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Chapter I. translated from the Latin of Rufinus: On the Freedom of the…