Maximus, Bishop of
Jerusalem.
[
a.d.
185–196.] He was a noted character among Christians,
according to Eusebius; living, according to Jerome, under Commodus and
Severus. He wrote on the inveterate question concerning the
Origin of Evil;
and the fragment here translated, as given by
Eusebius, is also textually cited by Origen against the
Marcionites,
3730
if that
Dialogue be his. The reader will not fail
to recollect that liberal citations out
of this work are also to be found in Methodius,
On
Free-Will
.
3731
But all
who desire fuller information on the subject will be gratified by the
learned
prolegomena
and notes of Routh, to which I refer
them.
3732
Whether Maximus was the bishop
of Jerusalem (
a.d.
185) mentioned by Eusebius
as presiding in that See in the sixth year of Commodus, seems to be
uncertain.
From the Book Concerning Matter, or in
Defence of the Proposition that Matter is Created, and is Not the Cause
of Evil.
3733
“
That
there cannot
exist two uncreated
substances
at one and the same time, I
presume that you hold equally
with myself
. You appear,
however, very decidedly to have assumed, and to have introduced into
the argument, this
principle
, that we must of unavoidable
necessity maintain one of two things: either that God is separate
from matter; or else, on the contrary, that He is indissolubly
connected with it.
“If, then, any one should choose to assert
that He exists in union
with matter
, that would be saying that
there is
only
one uncreated
substance
. For either
of the two must constitute a part of the other; and, since they form
parts of each other, they cannot be two uncreated
substances
. Just as, in speaking of man, we do not
describe him as subdivided into a number of distinct parts, each
forming a separate created
substance
, but, as reason requires us
to do, assert that he was made by God a single created
substance
consisting of many parts,—so, in like manner, if God is not
separate from matter, we are driven to the conclusion that there is
only
one uncreated
substance
.
“If, on the other hand, it be affirmed that
He is separate
from matter
, it necessarily follows that there is
some
other substance
intermediate between the two, by which
their separation is made apparent. For it is impossible that one
thing should be shown to be severed by an interval from another, unless
there be something else by which the interval between the two is
produced. This
principle
, too, holds good not only with
regard to this or any other single case, but in any number of cases you
please. For the same argument which we have employed in dealing
with the two uncreated
substances
must in like manner be valid
if the substances
in question
be given as three. For in
regard to these also I should
have to
inquire whether they are
separate from one another, or whether, on the contrary, each of them is
united to its fellow. For, if you should say that they are
united, you would hear from me the same argument as before; but if, on
the contrary, you should say that they are separate, you could not
escape the unavoidable assumption of a separating
medium
.
“If, again, perchance any one should think
that there is a third view which may be consistently maintained with
regard to uncreated
substances
,—namely, that God is not
separate from matter, nor yet, on the other hand, united to it as a
part, but that God exists in matter as in a place, or possibly matter
exists in God,—let such a person observe the
consequence:—
“That, if we make matter God’s place,
we must of necessity admit that He can be contained,
3734
and that He is circumscribed by
matter. Nay, further, he must grant that He is, in the same way
as matter, driven about hither and thither, unable to maintain His
place and to stay where He is, since that in which He exists is
perpetually being driven about in one direction or another.
Beside this, he must also admit that God has had His place among the
worst
kind of elements
. For if matter was once in
disorder, and if he reduced it to order for the purpose of rendering it
better, there was a time when God existed among
the
disordered
elements of matter
.
“I might also fairly put this
question: whether God filled the whole of matter, or was in some
part of it. If any one should choose to say that God was in some
part of matter, he would be making Him indefinitely smaller than
matter, inasmuch as a part of it contained the whole of Him;
3735
but, if he maintained that He pervaded
the whole of matter, I need to be informed how He became the Fashioner
of this
matter
. For we must necessarily assume, either
that there was on the part of God a contraction,
3736
so to speak, of Himself,
and a
withdrawal from matter
, whereupon He proceeded to fashion that from
which He had retired; or else that He fashioned Himself in conjunction
with matter, in consequence of having no place to retire to.
“But suppose it to be maintained, on the
other hand, that matter is in God, it will behove us similarly to
inquire, whether we are to understand by this that He is sundered from
Himself, and that, just like the air, which contains
various
kinds of animals, so is He sundered and divided into parts for the
reception of those
creatures
which from time to time exist in
3737
Him; or whether
matter is in
God
as in a place,—for instance, as water is contained in
earth. For should we say ‘as in air,’ we should
perforce be speaking of God as divisible into parts; but if ‘as
water in earth,’ and if matter was,
as is admitted
, in
confusion and disorder, and moreover also contained what was evil, we
should have to admit that God is the place of disorder and evil.
But this it does not seem to me consistent with reverence to say, but
hazardous rather. For you contend that matter is
uncreated,
3738
that you
may not have to admit that God is the author of evil; and yet, while
aiming to escape this
difficulty
, you make Him the receptacle of
evil.
“If you had stated that your suspicion that
matter was uncreated arose from the nature of created things as we find
them,
3739
I should have employed abundant
argument in proof that it cannot be so. But, since you have
spoken of the existence of evil as the cause of such suspicion, I am
disposed to enter upon a
separate
examination of this
point. For, when once it has been made clear how it is that evil
exists, and when it is seen to be impossible to deny that God is the
author of evil, in consequence of His having had recourse to matter for
His materials,
3740
it seems to me
that a suspicion of this kind disappears.
“You assert, then, that matter, destitute of
all qualities
good or bad
, co-existed at the outset with God,
and that out of it He fashioned the world as we now find
it.”
“Such is my opinion.”
“Well, then, if matter was without any qualities,
and the world has come into existence from God, and if the world
possesses qualities, the author of those qualities must be
God.”
“Exactly so.”
“Since, too, I heard you say yourself just
now that out of nothing
3741
nothing can
possibly come, give me an answer to the question I am about to ask
you. You seem to me to think that the qualities of the world have
not sprung from pre-existing
3742
qualities,
and moreover that they are something different from the substances
themselves
.”
“I do.”
“If, therefore, God did not produce the
qualities
in question
from qualities already existing, nor yet
from substances, by reason that they are not substances, the conclusion
is inevitable, that they were made by God out of nothing. So that
you seemed to me to affirm more than you were warranted to do,
when
you said
that it had been proved impossible to hold the
opinion
3743
that
anything was made by God out of nothing.
“But let us put the matter thus. We
see persons among ourselves making certain things out of nothing,
however true it may be that they make them by means of
something.
3744
Let us
take our illustration, say, from builders. These men do not make
cities out of cities; nor, similarly, temples out of temples.
Nay, if you suppose that, because the substances
necessary
for
these
constructions
are already provided, therefore they make
them out of that which already exists, your reasoning is
fallacious. For it is not the substance that makes the city or
the temples, but the art which is employed about the substance.
Neither,
again
, does the art proceed from any art inhering in
the substances, but it arises independently of any such art in
them.
“But I fancy you will meet the argument by
saying that the artist produces the art which is
manifest
in the
substance
he has fashioned
out of the art which he
himself
already
has. In reply to this, however, I think it may be
fairly said, that neither in man does art spring from any already
existing art. For we cannot possibly allow that art exists by
itself, since it belongs to the class of things which are accidentals,
and which receive their existence only when they appear in
connection with
substance. For man will exist though there
should be no architecture, but the latter will have no existence unless
there be first of all man. Thus we cannot avoid the conclusion,
that it is the nature of art to spring up in man out of nothing.
If, then, we have shown that this is the case with man, we surely must
allow that God can make not only the qualities
of substances
out
of nothing, but also the substances
themselves
. For, if it
appears possible that anything
whatever
can be made out of
nothing, it is proved that this may be the case with substances
also.
“But, since you are specially desirous of
inquiring about the origin of evil, I will proceed to the discussion of
this topic. And I should like to ask you a few questions.
Is it your opinion that things evil are substances, or that they are
qualities of substances?”
“Qualities of substances, I am disposed to
say.”
“But matter was destitute of qualities and of
form: this I assumed at the outset of the discussion.
Therefore, if things evil are qualities of substances, and matter was
destitute of qualities, and you have called God the author of
qualities, God will also be the former of that which is evil.
Since, then, it is not possible, on
this supposition any more than on the
other, to speak of God as not the cause of evil, it seems to me
superfluous to add matter to Him,
as if that were the cause of
evil
. If you have any reply to make to this, begin your
argument.”
“If, indeed, our discussion had arisen from
a love of contention, I should not be willing to have the inquiry
raised a second time about
the origin of
evil; but, since we are
prompted rather by friendship and the good of our neighbour to engage
in controversy, I readily consent to have the question raised afresh on
this subject. You have no doubt long been aware of the character
of my mind, and of the object at which I aim in dispute: that I
have no wish to vanquish falsehood by plausible reasoning, but rather
that truth should be established in connection with thorough
investigation. You yourself, too, are of the same mind, I am well
assured. Whatever method, therefore, you deem successful for the
discovery of truth, do not shrink from using it. For, by
following a better course of argument, you will not only confer a
benefit on yourself, but most assuredly on me also,
instructing
me
concerning matters of which I am ignorant.”
“You seem clearly to agree with
3745
me, that things evil are in some sort
substances:
3746
for, apart
from substances, I do not see them to have any existence. Since,
then, my good friend, you say that things evil are substances, it is
necessary to inquire into the nature of substance. Is it your
opinion that substance is a kind of bodily structure?”
3747
“It is.”
“And does that bodily structure exist by itself,
without the need of any one to come and give it existence?”
“Yes.”
“And does it seem to you that things evil
are connected with certain
courses of
action?”
“That is my belief.”
“And do actions come into existence only when an
actor is there?”
“Yes.”
“And, when there is no actor, neither will his
action ever take place?”
“It will not.”
“If, therefore, substance is a kind of
bodily structure, and this does not stand in need of some one in and
through whom it may receive its existence, and if things evil are
actions of some one, and actions require some one in and through whom
they receive their existence,—things evil will ‘not’
be substances. And if things evil are not substances, and murder
is an evil,
and
is the action of some one, it follows that
murder is not a substance. But, if you insist that agents are
substance, then I myself agree with you. A man, for instance, who
is a murderer, is, in so far as he is a man, a substance; but the
murder which he commits is not a substance, but a work of the
substance. Moreover, we speak of a man sometimes as bad because
he commits murder; and sometimes, again, because he performs acts of
beneficence, as good: and these names adhere to the substance, in
consequence of the things which are accidents of it, which,
however
, are not
the substance
itself. For neither
is the substance murder, nor, again, is it adultery, nor is it any
other
similar evil. But, just as the grammarian derives
his name from grammar, and the orator from oratory, and the physician
from physic, though the substance is not physic, nor yet oratory, nor
grammar, but receives its appellation from the things which are
accidents of it, from which it popularly receives its name, though it
is not any one of them,—so in like manner it appears to me that
the substance receives name from things regarded as evil, though it is
not
itself
any one of them.
“I must beg you also to consider that, if
you represent some other being as the cause of evil to men, he also, in
so far as he acts in them, and incites them to do evil, is himself
evil, by reason of the things he does. For he too is said to be
evil, for the simple reason that he is the doer of evil things; but the
things which a being does are not the being himself, but his actions,
from which he receives his appellation, and is called evil. For
if we should say that the things he does are himself, and these consist
in murder, and adultery, and theft, and such-like, these things will be
himself. And if these things are himself, and if when they take
place they get to have a substantial existence,
3748
but by not taking place they also
cease to exist, and if these things are done by men,—men will be
the doers of these things, and the causes of existing and of no longer
existing. But, if you affirm that these things are his actions,
he gets to be evil from the things he does, not from those things of
which the substance
of him
consists.
“Moreover, we have said that he is called
evil from those things which are accidents of the substance, which are
not
themselves
the substance: as a physician from the art
of physic. But, if he receives the beginning of his existence
from the actions he performs, he too began to be evil, and these evil
things likewise began to exist. And, if so, an evil being will
not be without a beginning, nor will evil things be unoriginated, since
we have said that they are originated by him.”
“The
argument relating to the opinion I before expressed, you seem to me, my
friend, to have handled satisfactorily: for, from the premises
you assumed in the discussion, I think you have drawn a fair
conclusion. For, beyond doubt, if matter was
at first
destitute of qualities, and if God is the fashioner of the qualities
it now has
, and if evil things are qualities, God is the author
of those evil things. The argument, then, relating to that
opinion
we may consider as well discussed, and to me it
now
seems false to speak of matter as destitute of
qualities. For it is not possible to say of any
substance
3749
whatsoever
that it is without qualities. For, in the very act of saying that
it is destitute of qualities, you do
in fact
indicate its
quality, representing of what kind matter is, which of course is
ascribing to it
a species of quality. Wherefore, if it is
agreeable to you, rehearse the argument to me from the beginning:
for, to me, matter seems to have had qualifies from all
eternity.
3750
For in
this way I
can
affirm that evil things also come from it in the
way of emanation, so that the cause of evil things may not be ascribed
to God, but that matter may be
regarded as
the cause of all such
things.”
“I approve your desire, my friend, and
praise the zeal you manifest in the discussion of opinions. For
it assuredly becomes every one who is desirous of knowledge, not simply
and out of hand to agree with what is said, but to make a careful
examination of the arguments
adduced
. For, though a
disputant, by laying down false premises, may make his opponent draw
the conclusion he wishes, yet he will not convince a hearer of this;
but only when he says that which
3751
it seems
possible to say with fairness. So that one of two things will
happen: either he will, as he listens, be decisively helped to
reach that
conclusion
towards which he
already
feels
himself impelled, or he will convict his adversary of not speaking the
truth.
“Now, it seems to me that you have not
sufficiently discussed the statement that matter has qualities from the
first. For, if this is the case, what will God be the maker
of? For, if we speak of substances, we affirm these to exist
beforehand; or if again of qualities, we declare these also to exist
already. Since, therefore both substance and qualities exist, it
seems to me unreasonable to call God a creator.
“But, lest I should seem to be constructing
an argument
to suit my purpose
, be so good as to answer the
question: In what way do you assert God to be a creator? Is
He such because He changed the substances, so that they should no
longer be the same as they had once been but become different from what
they were; or because, while He kept the substances the same as they
were before that period, He changed their qualities?”
“I do not at all think that any alteration
took place in substances: for it appears to me absurd to say
this. But I affirm that a certain change was made in their
qualities; and it is in respect of these that I speak of God as a
creator. Just as we might happen to speak of a house as made out
of stones, in which case we could not say that the stones no longer
continue to be stones as regards their substance, now that they are
made into a house (for I affirm that the house owes its existence to
the quality of its construction, forasmuch as the previous quality of
the stones has been changed),—so does it seem to me that God,
while the substance remains
the same
, has made a certain change
in its qualities; and it is in respect of such change that I speak of
the origin of this world as having come from God.”
“Since, then, you maintain that a certain
change—namely, of qualities—has been produced by God,
answer me briefly what I am desirous to ask you.”
“Proceed, pray, with your question.”
“Do you agree in the opinion that evil things are
qualities of substances?”
“I do.”
“Were these qualities in matter from the first, or
did they begin to be?”
“I hold that these qualifies existed in
combination with matter, without being originated.”
“But do you not affirm that God has made a certain
change in the qualities?”
“That is what I affirm.”
“For the better, or for the worse?”
“For the better, I should say.”
“Well, then, if evil things are qualities of
matter, and if the Lord
of all
changed its qualities for the
better, whence, it behoves us to ask, come evil things? For
either the qualities remained the same in their nature as they
previously were, or, if they were not evil before, but you assert that,
in consequence of a change wrought on them by God, the first qualities
of this kind came into existence in connection with matter,—God
will be the author of evil, inasmuch as He changed the qualities which
were not evil, so as to make them evil.
“Possibly, however, it is not your view that
God changed evil qualities for the better; but you mean that all those
other qualities which happened to be neither good nor bad,
3752
were changed by God with a view to the
adornment
of the creation
.”
“That has been my opinion from the
outset.”
“How,
then, can you say that He has left the qualities of bad things just as
they were? Is it that, although He was able to destroy those
qualities as well as the others, He was not willing; or
did He
refrain
because He had not the power? For, if you say He had
the power, but not the will, you must admit Him to be the cause of
these
qualities
: since, when He could have put a stop to
the existence of evil, He chose to let it remain as it was, and that,
too, at the very time when He began to fashion matter. For, if He
had not concerned Himself at all with matter, He would not have been
the cause of those things which He allowed to remain. But, seeing
that He fashioned a certain part of it, and left a certain part as we
have described it, although He could have changed that also for the
better, it seems to me that He deserves to have the blame cast on Him,
for having permitted a part of matter to be evil, to the ruin of that
other
part which He fashioned.
“Nay, more, it seems to me that the most serious
wrong has been committed as regards this part, in that He constituted
this part of matter so as to be now affected by evil. For, if we
were to examine carefully into things, we should find that the
condition of matter is worse now than in its former state, before it
was reduced to order. For, before it was separated into parts, it
had no sense of evil; but now every one of its parts is afflicted with
a sense of evil.
“Take an illustration from man. Before
he was fashioned, and became a living being through the art of the
Creator, he was by nature exempt from any contact whatever with evil;
but, as soon as ever he was made by God a man, he became liable to the
sense of even approaching evil: and thus that very thing which
you say was brought about by God for the benefit of matter,
3753
is found to have turned out rather to
its detriment.
“But, if you say that evil has not been put
a stop to, because God was unable to do away with it, you will be
making God powerless. But, if He is powerless, it will be either
because He is weak by nature, or because He is overcome by fear, and
reduced to subjection by a stronger. If, then, you go so far as
to say that God is weak by nature, it seems to me that you imperil your
salvation itself; but, if
you say that He is weak
through being
overcome by fear of a greater, things evil will be greater than God,
since they frustrate the carrying out of His purpose. But this,
as it seems to me, it would be absurd to say of God. For why
should not ‘they’ rather be
considered
gods, since
according to your account they are able to overcome God: if, that
is to say, we mean by God that which has a controlling power over all
things?
“But I wish to ask you a few questions
concerning matter itself. Pray tell me, therefore, whether matter
was something simple or compound. I am induced to adopt this
method of investigating the subject before us by
considering
the
diversity that obtains in existing things. For, if perchance
matter was something simple and uniform, how comes it that the world is
compound,
3754
and consists
of divers substances and combinations? For by
‘compound’ we denote a mixture of certain simple
elements
. But if, on the contrary, you prefer to call
matter compound, you will, of course, be asserting that it is
compounded of certain simple elements. And, if it was compounded
of simple elements, these simple elements must have existed at some
time or other separately by themselves, and when they were compounded
together matter came into being: from which it of course follows
that matter is created. For, if matter is compound, and compound
things are constituted from simple, there was once a time when matter
had no existence,—namely, before the simple elements came
together. And, if there was once a time when matter was not, and
there was never a time when the uncreated was not, matter cannot be
uncreated. And hence there will be many uncreated
substances
. For, if God was uncreated, and the simple
elements out of which matter was compounded
were also uncreated
,
there will not be two uncreated things only,—not to discuss the
question what it is which constitutes objects simple, whether matter or
form.
“Is it, further, your opinion that nothing in
existence is opposed to itself?”
“It is.”
“Is water, then, opposed to fire?”
“So it appears to me.”
“Similarly, is darkness opposed to light, and warm
to cold, and moreover moist to dry?”
“It seems to me to be so.”
“Well, then, if nothing in existence is opposed to
itself, and these things are opposed to each other, they cannot be one
and the same matter; no, nor yet be made out of one and the same
matter.
“I wish further to ask your opinion on a
matter kindred to that of which we have been speaking. Do you
believe that the parts
of a thing
are not mutually
destructive?”
“I do.”
“And you believe that fire and water, and so on,
are parts of matter?”
“Quite so.”
“Do you not also believe that water is subversive
of fire, and light of darkness, and so of all similar
things?”
“Yes.”
“Well,
then, if the parts
of a whole
are not mutually destructive, and
yet the parts of matter are mutually destructive, they cannot be parts
of one matter. And, if they are not parts of one another, they
cannot be composed of one and the same matter; nay, they cannot be
matter at all, since nothing in existence is destructive of itself, as
we learn from the doctrine of opposites: for nothing is opposed
to itself—an opposite being by nature opposed to something
else. White, for example, is not opposed to itself, but is said
to be the opposite of black; and, similarly, light is shown not to be
opposed to itself, but is considered an opposite in relation to
darkness; and so of a very great number of things besides. If,
then, matter were some one thing, it could not be opposed to
itself. This, then, being the nature of opposites, it is proved
that matter has no existence.”’
————————————
3730
A fact
which gave rise to a controversy, on which consult Routh,
Rel.
Sac
., vol. ii. p. 78.
3731
See vol. vi. p.
358, etc., this series, where I have spoken of Maximus as the original
of the Dialogue ascribed to Methodius.
3732
Routh,
Rel. Sac
., vol. ii. p. 85. See pp. 77–121, devoted
to this author.
3733
In
Eusebius,
Præp. Evang
., vii. 22.
3734
Χωρητὸν
,
the reading of one
ms.,
instead of
χωρητικόν
.
3735
For
εἰ δὲ
μέρος αὐτῆς,
ὅλον
ἐχώρησεν
αὐτόν
, Migne reads,
εἴ γε
(or
εἰ δὴ
)
μέρος
αὐτῆς ὅλον,
κ.τ.λ
.
3736
Συστολήν
τινα
.
3737
Τῶν
γινομένων
(
ἐν
)
αὐτῷ
, Migne.
3738
This word,
ἀγέννητον
, is
added from Migne’s conjecture.
3739
᾽Εκ
τῶν
ὑποστάντων
γενητῶν
.
3740
᾽Εκ
τοῦ ὕλην
αὐτὸν
ὑποτιθέναι
.
3741
᾽Εξ
οὐκ ὄντων
. [Note
this phrase. Comp. vol. vi. p. 292, n. 3.]
3742
῾Υποκειμένων
.
3743
For
συλλελόγισται
ὡς οὐκ
ἀδύνατον
εἶναι
δοξάζειν
, Migne reads,
ὡς συλλελόγισται
ἀδύνατον
εἶναι
δοξάζειν
.
3744
Lit. “in
something.” Whether the materials or the art is meant is
not very clear. Possibly there is a play of words in the use of
the two prepositions,
ἐκ
and
ἐν
.
3745
Migne, instead of
παραστῆναι
,
conjectures
παραστῆσαι
,
which, however, would not suit what appears to be the meaning.
3746
Οὐσίας
τινάς
.
3747
Σωματικήν
τινα
σύστασιν
.
3748
Τὴν
σύστασιν
ἔχει
.
3749
Migne reads
οὐσίας
for
αἰτίας
.
3750
᾽Ανάρχως
.
3751
Reading, with
Migne,
εἰ ὅ
τι
for
εἴ
τι
.
3752
Or
“indifferent:”
ἀδιάφοροι
.
3753
Migne reads
ἐπ᾽
εὐεργεσίᾳ
for
ἐστὶν
εὐεργεσία
.
3754
The text has,
σύνθετος δὲ
ὁ κόσμος
; which Migne
changes to,
πῶς
δὴ σύνθετός
ἐστιν ὁ
κόσμος
;