316 INSTITUTES OF THE BOOK II.
one kind of intelligence of earthly things, and another of
heavenly things. By earthly things, I mean those which
relate not to God and his kingdom, to true righteousness
and future blessedness, but have some connection with the
present life, and are in a manner confined within its bound
aries. By heavenly things, I mean the pure knowledge of
God, the method of true righteousness, and the mysteries of
the heavenly kingdom. To the former belong matters of
policy and economy, all mechanical arts and liberal studies.
To the latter (as to which, see the eighteenth and following
sections) belong the knowledge of God and of his will, and
the means of framing the life in accordance with them. As
to the former, the view to be taken is this : Since man is by
nature a social animal, he is disposed, from natural instinct,
to cherish and preserve society ; and accordingly we see that
the minds of all men have impressions of civil order and
honesty. Hence it is that every individual understands how
human societies must be regulated by laws, and also is able to
comprehend the principles of those laws. Hence the universal
agreement in regard to such subjects, both among nations and
individuals, the seeds of them being implanted in the breasts
of all without a teacher or lawgiver. The truth of this fact is
not affected by the wars and dissensions which immediately
arise, while some, such as thieves and robbers, would invert
the rules of justice, loosen the bonds of law, and give free
scope to their lust; and while others (a vice of most
frequent occurrence) deem that to be unjust which is
elsewhere regarded as just, and, on the contrary, hold that
to be praiseworthy which is elsewhere forbidden. For such
persons do not hate the laws from not knowing that they
are good and sacred, but, inflamed with headlong passion,
quarrel with what is clearly reasonable, and licentiously hate
what their mind and understanding approve. Quarrels of
this latter kind do not destroy the primary idea of jus
tice. For while men dispute with each other as to particu
lar enactments, their ideas of equity agree in substance.
This, no doubt, proves the weakness of the human mind,
which, even when it seems on the right path, halts and
hesitates. Still, however, it is true, that some principle of