or quality of mind, which is the result of enjoying an object suited to our wants. And to desire ultimate happiness,
without including the object of choice from whence happiness results, is the same as to seek happiness in nothing.
If it be said, that happiness itself is the object sought; then virtue consists in a voluntary tendency to seek happiness
in happiness, which is absurd. 13. Ultimate happiness has been defined, “the durable possession of perfect good.”
If this be a just statement, which few or none will question, what is the perfect good possessed? If it be answered,
The Supreme Being: to this there is no objection. But if it be said, the ultimate happiness itself is the perfect good
enjoyed: then the happiness to which the choice is directed is both cause and effect at the same time. Both the
thing enjoyed and the enjoyment itself are the same thing. Which is no less absurd than for a man to assert, that
the stock of a tree and the fruit on its branches, are the same thing; or that his relish of food is the same as the
food itself. A tendency to happiness resulting from no object of that tendency, is the same thing as a tendency
to no happiness. In other words, according to this definition, supposing the tendency to be voluntary, virtue is
a desire of ultimate happiness. And this will reduce it to another absurdity; for, as a desire of ultimate happiness
is an inseparable property of intelligent beings, the most vicious being in existence is virtuous. These consequences,
however just, will not be thought very extraordinary, when compared with the following declarations. “The
following seems to be at present the true moral state of the world: In every moral agent the number of virtuous
actions greatly exceed that of vicious ones.—In by far the greater number of moral agents, and even amongst
those who are considered as most vicious and profligate, the number of virtuous affections and habits greatly
preponderates over the vicious ones. A character in which there is a preponderance of vice, is very rarely, if ever,
to be met with.” (Belsham’s Elements, p. 400.) And, to advance one step further in this hopeful way, as this desire
belongs to all intelligent beings alike, all intelligent beings are alike virtuous! 14. In reality, a mere desire of ultimate
happiness is no virtue, has nothing laudable in it, but is a mere instinct of intellectual nature, and belongs alike
to the best and the worst of intelligent beings. But virtue consists in the choice of, or a disposition to choose,
laudable means in order to arrive at this end. A bad man in his choice of objects, or a vicious choice itself, aims
at ultimate happiness; but the means are not laudable, and this wrong choice of means constitutes the very essence
of his vice. 15. If it be said, that virtue is a tendency to ultimate self-enjoyment, as constituting happiness; then
it follows that self is the perfect good desired. And then every one is himself all-sufficient to constitute his own
happiness. Let any rational person judge, whether this be not a definition of sordid vice, rather than of virtue;
and whether such a disposition would not be a tendency to insubordination, anarchy, and confusion, rather
than to happiness—the very temper of an apostate spirit. 16. If it be said, moreover, that “a tendency to ultimate
happiness,” does not refer to the will, desire, or choice; but expresses any thing which in fact tends to ultimate
happiness. This leads us to suppose secondly, that the tendency is involuntary. It seems, then, on this supposition,
that the means employed to acquire ultimate happiness need not be laudable. This is the genuine result of that
account of virtue which is here animadverted upon; and which the abettors of it are forced to admit. The doctrine
of “intrinsic merit or demerit of actions. Independent on their consequences.” they call an “absurd supposition.”
(Belsham’s Elements, p. 309, 372, 373.) 17. It seems, then, we are all bound to be virtuous at our peril, and yet
we must wait the result of all our actions, before we can know what is virtuous and what is not. For if virtue and
vice have no intrinsic character of good or evil, but actions, affections, habits, or characters, are either good or
bad from their ultimate consequences; then we must wait for those consequences, as the only expositors of virtue
and vice. 18. Can any thing more be necessary, in order to show the absurdity of such a notion of virtue? Hap-
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CHAPTER I. Concerning the essence of true virtue.