would be wholly vain and fruitless. For it is only by virtue of some connexion, that they be-
come successful: It is some connexion observed, or revealed, or otherwise known, between
antecedent things and following ones, that directs in the choice of Means. And if there were
no such thing as an established connexion, there could be no choice, as to Means; one thing
would have no more tendency to an effect, than another; there would be no such thing as
tendency in the case. All those things, which are successful Means of other things, do therein
prove connected antecedents of them: and therefore to assert, that a fixed connexion between
antecedents and consequents makes Means vain and useless, or stands in the way to hinder
the connexion between Means and end, is just so ridiculous, as to say, that a connexion
between antecedents and consequents stands in the way to hinder a connexion between
antecedents and consequents.
Nor can any supposed connexion of the succession or train of antecedents and con-
sequents, from the very beginning of all things, the connexion being made already sure and
necessary, either by established laws of nature, or by these together with a decree of sovereign
immediate interpositions of divine power, on such and such occasions, or any other way (if
any other there be); I say, no such necessary connexion of a series of antecedents and con-
sequents can in the least tend to hinder, but that the Means we use may belong to the series;
and so may be some of those antecedents which are connected with the consequents we aim
at, in the established course of things. Endeavours which we use, are things that exist; and,
therefore, they belong to the general chain of events; all the parts of which chain are supposed
to be connected: and so Endeavours are supposed to be connected with some effects, or
some consequent things or other. And certainly this does not hinder but that the events
they are connected with, may be those which we aim at, and which we choose, because we
judge them most likely to have a connexion with those events, from the established order
and course of things which we observe, or from something in divine revelation.
Let us suppose a real and sure connexion between a man having his eyes open in the
clear day-light, with good organs of sight, and seeing; so that seeing is connected with his
opening his eyes, and not seeing with his not opening his eyes; and also the like connexion
between such a man attempting to open his eyes, and his actually doing it: the supposed
established connexion between these antecedents and consequents, let the connexion be
never so sure and necessary, certainly does not prove that it is in vain, for a man in such
circumstances to attempt to open his eyes, in order to seeing: his aiming at that event, and
the use of the Means, being the effect of his Will, does not break the connexion, or hinder
the success.
So that the objection we are upon does not lie against the doctrine of the Necessity of
events by a certainty of connexion and consequence: On the contrary, it is truly forcible
against the Arminian doctrine of contingence and self-determination; which is inconsistent
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SECTION V. Objections, that this scheme of Necessity renders all Means…