Firstborn before all creation, from signifying by that title of Father at one and the same time
the having begotten that Son, and also the not being from any more transcendent Cause.
For he who speaks of the First Father means Him who is presupposed before all existence,
Whose is the beyond203. This is He, Who has nothing previous to Himself to behold, no
end in which He shall cease. Whichever way we look, He is equally existing there for ever;
He transcends the limit of any end, the idea of any beginning, by the infinitude of His life;
whatever be His title, eternity must be implied with it.
But Eunomius, versed as he is in the contemplation of that which eludes thought, rejects
this view of unscientific minds; he will not admit a double meaning in the word ‘Father,’
the one, that from Him are all things and in the front of all things the Only-begotten Son,
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the other, that He Himself has no superior Cause. He may scorn the statement; but we will
brave his mocking laugh, and repeat what we have said already, that the ‘Father’ is the same
as that Ungenerate One, and both signifies the having begotten the Son, and represents the
being from nothing.
But Eunomius, contending with this statement of ours, says (the very contrary now of
what he said before), “If God is Father because He has begotten the Son, and ‘Father’ has
the same meaning as Ungenerate, God is Ungenerate because He has begotten the Son, but
before He begat Him He was not Ungenerate.” Observe his method of turning round; how
he pulls his first quibble to pieces, and turns it into the very opposite, thinking even so to
entrap us in a conclusion from which there is no escape. His first syllogism presented the
following absurdity, “If ‘Father’ means the coming from nothing, then necessarily it will no
longer indicate the having begotten the Son.” But this last syllogism, by turning (a premiss)
into its contrary, threatens our faith with another absurdity. How, then, does he pull to
pieces his former conclusion204? “If He is ‘Father’ because He has begotten a Son.” His first
syllogism gave us nothing like that; on the contrary, its logical inference purported to show
that if the Father’s not having been generated was meant by the word Father, that word
could not mean as well the having begotten a Son205. Thus his first syllogism contained no
203 ἐνεδείξατο, οὗ τὸ ἐπέκεινα. This is the reading of the Turin Cod., and preferable to that of the Paris edition.
204 The first syllogism was— ‘Father’ means the ‘coming from nothing;’ (‘Coming from nothing’ does not
mean ‘begetting a Son’) Father does not mean begetting a Son. He “pulls to pieces” this conclusion by taking
its logical ‘contrary’ as the first premiss of his second syllogism; thus— Father means begetting a Son; (Father
means ᾽Αγέννητος) ᾽Αγέννητος means begetting a Son. From which it follows that before that begetting the
Almighty was not ᾽Αγέννητος The conclusion of the last syllogism also involves the contrary of the 2nd premiss
of the first. It is to be noticed that both syllogisms are aimed at Basil’s doctrine, ‘Father’ means ‘coming from
nothing.’ Eunomius strives to show that, in both, such a premiss leads to an absurdity. But Gregory ridicules
both for contradicting each other.
205 τὸ μὲν μὴ δύνασθαι. The negative, absent in Oehler, is recovered from the Turin Cod.
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Several ways of controverting his quibbling syllogisms.