or excite future acts of the Will; but such desires and endeavors are, in many cases, rendered
insufficient and vain, through fixedness of habit: when the occasion returns, the strength
of habit overcomes and baffles all such opposition. In this respect, a man may be in miserable
slavery and bondage to a strong habit. But it may be comparatively easy to make an alteration,
with respect to such future acts, as are only occasional and transient; because the occasion
or transient cause, if foreseen, may often easily be prevented or avoided. On this account,
the moral Inability that attends fixed habits, especially obtains the name of Inability. And
then, as the will may remotely and indirectly resist itself, and do it in vain, in the case of
strong habits; so reason may resist present acts of the Will, and its resistance be insufficient;
and this is more commonly the case also, when the acts arise from strong habit.
But it must be observed concerning moral Inability, in each kind of it, that the word
Inability is used in a sense very diverse from its original import. The word signifies only a
natural Inability, in the proper use of it; and is applied to such cases only wherein a present
will or inclination to the thing, with respect to which a person is said to be unable, is suppos-
able. It cannot be truly said, according to the ordinary use of language, that a malicious man,
let him be never so malicious, cannot hold his hand from striking, or that he is not able to
show his neighbor kindness; or that a drunkard, let his appetite be never so strong, cannot
keep the cup from his mouth. In the strictest propriety of speech, a man has a thing in his
power, if he has it in his choice, or at his election: and a man cannot be truly said to be unable
to do a thing, when he can do it if he will. It is improperly said, that a person cannot perform
those external actions, which are dependent on the act of the Will, and which would be
easily performed, if the act of the Will were present. And if it be improperly said, that he
cannot perform those external voluntary actions, which depend on the Will, it is in some
respect more improperly said, that he is unable to exert the acts of the Will themselves; be-
cause it is more evidently false, with respect to these, that he cannot if he will: for to say so,
is a downright contradiction; it is to say, he cannot will, if he does will. And in this case, not
only is it true, that it is easy for a man to do the thing if he will, but the very willing is the
doing; when once he has willed, the thing is performed; and nothing else remains to be
done. Therefore, in these things, to ascribe a non-performance to the want of power or
ability, is not just; because the thing wanting is not a being able, but a being willing. There
are faculties of mind, and a capacity of nature, and every thing else, sufficient, but a dispos-
ition: nothing is wanting but a will.
538
SECTION IV Of the distinction of natural and moral Necessity, and Inability.…