equally demonstrable that such a principle is the inseparable concomitant of every creature. It is of prior consid-
eration to moral agency; for whatever is a property of a created nature as such, is of prior consideration to the
agency of that creature. Consequently it is a property neither divinely appointed, nor yet a moral evil. 16. Liberty,
in one sense, bears the same relation to good and evil, as rectitude does to benevolence and passive power.
Liberty in itself is equally a medium between good and evil, as rectitude is between benevolence and passive
power; and the medium is of a nature perfectly distinct from both extremes. To which we may add, that liberty
united to or under the influence of, sovereign benevolence, generates virtue; but liberty united to, or under the
influence of, passive power, generates vice. 17. From the premises it may be seen, that the existence of all evil,
and especially moral evil, in the universe, is not inconsistent with the moral perfections of God. It is evident also
that in no sense whatever except by a total misapplication of terms, can God be said to be “the author of sin.”
Nor can it be said that God “wills the event of sin;” but the contrary is plain, that he does not will it either in a
decretive, a legislative, or any other sense. 18. The great source of confusion into which many authors have
plunged themselves, is, that they draw too hasty an inference in attempting to make not hindering an event to
be ultimately the same as willing it. Upon their data, indeed, it may be true, while they regard every event alike
to be the effect of divine energy, and even the worst, in order to answer a good end. And this will always be the
case, for self-consistency requires it, until we see and acknowledge a metaphysical negative cause of moral evil,
and an eternal nature of things antecedent to all will, with their infallible effects, when not counteracted by
sovereign benevolence. 19. Let us now view the subject in the light of terms a little different. Much error often
arises through the defect of language; and where there is danger of misapprehension, it may be of use to change
expressions. Hereby a difficult subject may be taken by different handles, or a reader may apprehend it by one
handle, which he could not by another. Let us then substitute the word equity Instead of rectitude. and undeserved
favour instead of benevolence. postulate. Whatever is perfectly consistent with equity is also perfectly consistent
with the moral character of God. 20. Whatever to the pure effect at equity and the nature of things, or essential
truth, united, cannot be inconsistent with the moral perfections of God; the existence of morel evil in the universe
is the pure effect of these; therefore the existence of moral evil in the universe cannot be inconsistent with the
moral perfections of God. 21. The only ground of hesitation here is, now moral evil is the effect of equity and
the nature of things? Liberty itself is a natural good, and therefore is the fruit of divine favour; and toe mere ex-
ercise of liberty must be ascribed to the same cause. But he who is hypothetically free to good, must be in like
manner free to evil. For this hypothetical freedom either to good or to evil is what constitutes the morality of
his acts of choice. Take away this hypothetical freedom, and you take away the essence of moral agency. It is
plain, then, that to possess this freedom and consequent moral agency, is not inconsistent with the equity,
rectitude, or moral perfections of God. Yet it is demonstrable that freedom cannot be influenced in its choice,
so as to constitute it virtuous or vicious, holy or sinful, morally right or wrong, good or evil, but from two causes
radically; divine favour and passive power. If the agent be under the influence of divine favour, a happy result,
in the same proportion, is secured by the same essential truth as renders the choice of the great I AM, Infallibly
good; which no one will say is inconsistent with the divine perfections. For though favour raises the agent above
what rigid or pure equity can do, there is no incontinence between them; any more than between paying a just
debt, and bestowing also a free gift in addition. But if the agent be not under the influence of undeserved favour,
the only alternative is, that be must necessarily be under the influence of passive power. And as nothing can
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SECTION IX. Concerning that objection against the doctrine which has been…