SECT. VIII.
Some further objections against the moral Necessity of God’s Volitions considered.
The author last cited, as has been observed, owns that God, being perfectly wise, will
constantly and certainly choose what appears most fit, where there is a superior fitness and
goodness in things; and that it is not possible for him to do otherwise. So that it is in effect
confessed, that in those things where there is any real preferableness, it is no dishonour,
nothing in any respect unworthy of God, for him to act from Necessity; notwithstanding
all that can be objected from the agreement of such a Necessity with the fate of the Stoics,
and the Necessity maintained by Mr. Hobbes. From which it will follow, that if in all the
different things, among which God chooses, there were evermore a superior fitness or
preferableness on one side, then it would be no dishonour, or any thing unbecoming, for
God’s Will to be necessarily determined in every thing. And if this be allowed, it is giving
up entirely the argument, from the unsuitableness of such a Necessity to the liberty, suprem-
acy, independence, and glory of the Divine Being; and resting the whole weight of the affair
on the decision of another point wholly diverse; viz. Whether it be so indeed, that in all the
various possible things, which are in God’s view, and may he considered as capable objects
of his choice, there is not evermore a preferableness in one thing above another. This is
denied by this author; who supposes, that in many instances, between two or more possible
things, which come within the view of the Divine Mind, there is a perfect indifference and
inequality, as to fitness or tendency, to attain any good end which God can have in view, or
to answer any of his designs. Now, therefore, I would consider whether this be evident.
The arguments brought to prove this, are of two kinds. (1.) It is urged, that, in many
instances, we must suppose there is absolutely no difference between various possible objects
of choice, which God has in view: and, (2.) that the difference between many things is so
inconsiderable, or of such a nature, that it would be unreasonable to suppose it to be of any
consequence; or to suppose that any of God’s wise designs would not be answered in any
one way as well as the other.
Therefore,
1. The first thing to be considered is, whether there are any instances wherein there is
a perfect likeness, and absolutely no difference, between different objects of choice, that are
proposed to the Divine Understanding?
And here, in the first place, it may be worthy to be considered, whether the contradiction
there is in the terms of the question proposed, does not give reason to suspect, that there is
an inconsistence in the thing supposed. It is inquired whether different objects of choice
may not be absolutely without difference? If they are absolutely without difference, then
how are they different objects of choice! If there be absolutely no difference, in any respect,
then there is no variety or distinction: for distinction is only by some difference. And if there
be no variety among proposed objects of choice, then there is no opportunity for variety of
SECTION VIII. Some further objections against the moral Necessity of God's Volitions considered.
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SECTION VIII. Some further objections against the moral Necessity of God's…