But it somehow seems to me now, I said, that the doctrine of the Resurrection necessarily
comes on for our discussion; a doctrine which I think is even at first sight true as well as
credible1862, as it is told us in Scripture; so that that will not come in question between us:
but since the weakness of the human understanding is strengthened still farther by any ar-
guments that are intelligible to us, it would be well not to leave this part of the subject, either,
without philosophical examination. Let us consider, then, what ought to be said about it.
As for the thinkers, the Teacher went on, outside our own system of thought, they have,
with all their diverse ways of looking at things, one in one point, another in another, ap-
proached and touched the doctrine of the Resurrection: while they none of them exactly
coincide with us, they have in no case wholly abandoned such an expectation. Some indeed
make human nature vile in their comprehensiveness, maintaining that a soul becomes al-
ternately that of a man and of something irrational; that it transmigrates into various bodies,
changing at pleasure from the man into fowl, fish, or beast, and then returning to human
453
kind. While some extend this absurdity even to trees1863 and shrubs, so that they consider
their wooden life as corresponding and akin to humanity, others of them hold only thus
much—that the soul exchanges one man for another man, so that the life of humanity is
continued always by means of the same souls, which, being exactly the same in number, are
being born perpetually first in one generation, then in another. As for ourselves, we take
1862 ἰδεῖν…ἵνα μὴ ἀμφιβάλλη. This is the reading of the Paris Editt.: ἰδεῖν seems to go closely with ἀληθὲς:
so that Krabinger’s δεῖν is not absolutely necessary.
1863 some extend this absurdity even to trees: Empedocles for instance. Cf. Philosophumena (of Hippolytus,
falsely attributed to Origen), p. 50, where two lines of his are quoted. Chrysostom’s words (I. iv. p. 196), “There
are those amongst them who carry souls into plants, into shrubs, and into dogs,” are taken by Matthæus to refer
to Empedocles. Cf. Celsus also (quoted in Origen, c. Cels. viii. 53), “Seeing then men are born bound to a body—no
matter whether the economy of the world required this, or that they are paying the penalty for some sin, or that
the soul is weighted with certain emotions till it is purified from them at the end of its destined cycle, three
myriad hours, according to Empedocles, being the necessary period of its wanderings far away from the Blessed
Ones, during which it passes successively into every perishable shape—we must believe any way that there exist
certain guardians of this prison-house.” See De Hom. Opif. c. 28. Empedocles can be no other, then, than “the
philosopher who asserts that the same thing may be born in anything:” below (p. 232 D). Anaxagoras, however,
seems to have indulged in the same dictum (πᾶν ἐν παντὶ), but with a difference; as Nicetas explains in his
commentary on Gregory Naz., Orations: “That everything is contained in everything Empedocles asserted, and
Anaxagoras asserted also: but not with the same meaning. Empedocles said it of the four elements, namely, that
they are not only divided and self-centred, but are also mingled with each other. This is clear from the fact that
every animal is engendered by all four. But Anaxagoras, finding an old proverb that nothing can be produced
out of nothing, did away with creation, and introduced ‘differentiation’ instead, &c.” See also Greg. Naz., Poems,
p. 170.
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On the Soul and the Resurrection.