Chapter 4.—The Opinion of the Peripatetics and Stoics About Mental Emotions.
Among the philosophers there are two opinions about these mental emotions, which
the Greeks call παθη, while some of our own writers, as Cicero, call them perturbations,336
some affections, and some, to render the Greek word more accurately, passions. Some say
that even the wise man is subject to these perturbations, though moderated and controlled
by reason, which imposes laws upon them, and so restrains them within necessary bounds.
This is the opinion of the Platonists and Aristotelians; for Aristotle was Plato’s disciple, and
the founder of the Peripatetic school. But others, as the Stoics, are of opinion that the wise
man is not subject to these perturbations. But Cicero, in his book De Finibus, shows that
the Stoics are here at variance with the Platonists and Peripatetics rather in words than in
reality; for the Stoics decline to apply the term “goods” to external and bodily advantages,337
because they reckon that the only good is virtue, the art of living well, and this exists only
in the mind. The other philosophers, again, use the simple and customary phraseology, and
do not scruple to call these things goods, though in comparison of virtue, which guides our
life, they are little and of small esteem. And thus it is obvious that, whether these outward
things are called goods or advantages, they are held in the same estimation by both parties,
and that in this matter the Stoics are pleasing themselves merely with a novel phraseology.
It seems, then, to me that in this question, whether the wise man is subject to mental passions,
or wholly free from them, the controversy is one of words rather than of things; for I think
that, if the reality and not the mere sound of the words is considered, the Stoics hold precisely
the same opinion as the Platonists and Peripatetics. For, omitting for brevity’s sake other
proofs which I might adduce in support of this opinion, I will state but one which I consider
conclusive. Aulus Gellius, a man of extensive erudition, and gifted with an eloquent and
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graceful style, relates, in his work entitled Noctes Atticæ338that he once made a voyage with
an eminent Stoic philosopher; and he goes on to relate fully and with gusto what I shall
barely state, that when the ship was tossed and in danger from a violent storm, the philo-
sopher grew pale with terror. This was noticed by those on board, who, though themselves
threatened with death, were curious to see whether a philosopher would be agitated like
other men. When the tempest had passed over, and as soon as their security gave them
freedom to resume their talk, one of the passengers, a rich and luxurious Asiatic, begins to
banter the philosopher, and rally him because he had even become pale with fear, while he
himself had been unmoved by the impending destruction. But the philosopher availed
himself of the reply of Aristippus the Socratic, who, on finding himself similarly bantered
336 De Fin. iii. 20; Tusc. Disp. iii. 4.
337 The distinction between bona and commoda is thus given by Seneca (Ep. 87, ad fin.): Commodum est
quod plus usus est quam molestiæ; bonum sincerum debet esse et ab omni parte innoxium.
338 Book xix. ch. 1.
The Opinion of the Peripatetics and Stoics About Mental Emotions.
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The Opinion of the Peripatetics and Stoics About Mental Emotions.