SECT. I.
Some things observed in general, which reason dictates.
Having observed these things, to prevent confusion, I now proceed to consider what
may, and what may not, be supposed to be God’s ultimate end in the creation of the world.
Indeed this affair seems property to be an affair of divine revelation. In order to be de-
termined what was designed, in the creating of the astonishing fabric of the universe we
behold, it becomes us to attend to, and rely on what HE has told us, who was the architect.
He best knows his own heart, and what his own ends and designs were, in the wonderful
works which he has wrought. Nor is it to be supposed that mankind—who, while destitute
of revelation, by the utmost improvements of their own reason, and advances in science
and philosophy, could come to no clear and established determination who the author of
the world was—would ever have obtained any tolerable settled judgment of the end which
the author of it proposed to himself in so vast, complicated, and wonderful a work of his
hands. And though it be true, that the revelation which God has given to men, as a light
shining in a dark place, has been the occasion of great improvement of their faculties, and
has taught men how to use their reason; and though mankind now, through the long-con-
tinued assistance they have had by this divine light, have come to great attainments in the
habitual exercise of reason; yet I confess it would be relying too much on reason, to determine
the affair of God’s last end in the creation of the world, without being herein principally
guided by divine revelation, since God has given a revelation containing instructions con-
cerning this very matter. Nevertheless, as objections have chiefly been made, against what
I think the Scriptures have truly revealed, from the pretended dictates of reason, I would,
in the first place, soberly consider in a few things, what seems rational to be supposed con-
cerning this affair;—and then proceed to consider what light divine revelation gives us in
it.
As to the first of these, I think the following things appear to be the dictates of reason:
1. That no notion of God’s last end in the creation of the world, is agreeable to reason,
which would truly imply any indigence, insufficiency, and mutability in God; or any depend-
ence of the Creator on the creature, for any part of his perfection or happiness. Because it
is evident, by both Scripture and reason, that God is infinitely, eternally, unchangeably, and
independently glorious and happy: that he cannot be profited by, or receive any thing from,
the creature; or be the subject of any sufferings, or diminution of his glory and felicity, from
any other being. The notion of God creating the world, in order to receive any thing properly
from the creature, is not only contrary to the nature of God, but inconsistent with the notion
of creation; which implies a being receiving its existence, and all that belongs to it, out of
nothing. And this implies the most perfect, absolute, and universal derivation and depend-
ence. Now, if the creature receives its ALL from God, entirely and perfectly, how is it possible
SECTION I. The general dictates of reason.
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SECTION I. The general dictates of reason.