An act of choice or preference is a comparative act, wherein the mind acts with reference
to two or more things that are compared, and stand in competition in the mind’s view. If
the mind, in this comparative act, prefers that which appears inferior in the comparison,
then the mind herein acts absolutely without Motive, or inducement, or any temptation
whatsoever. Then, if a hungry man has the offer of two sorts of food, to both which he finds
an appetite, but has a stronger appetite to one than the other; and there be no circumstances
or excitements whatsoever in the case to induce him to take either the one or the other, but
merely his appetite: if in the choice he makes between them, he chooses that which he has
least appetite to, and refuses that to which he has the strongest appetite, this is a choice made
absolutely without previous Motive, Excitement, Reason, or Temptation, as much as if he
were perfectly without all appetite to either; because his volition in this case is a comparative
act, following a comparative view of the food, which he chooses, in which view his preference
has absolutely no previous ground, yea, is against all previous ground and motive. And if
there be any principle in man, from whence an act of choice may arise after this manner,
from the same principle volition may arise wholly without Motive on either side. If the mind
in its volition can go beyond Motive, then it can go without Motive: for when it is beyond
the Motive, it is out of the reach of the Motive, out of the limits of its influence, and so
without. Motive. If so, this demonstrates the independence of volition on Motive; and no
reason can be given for what Mr. Chubb so often asserts, even that ”in the nature of things
volition cannot take place without a motive to induce it.”
If the Most High should endow a balance with agency or activity of nature, in such a
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manner, that when unequal weights are put into the scales, its agency could enable it to
cause that scale to descend, which has the least weight, and so to raise the greater weight;
this would clearly demonstrate, that the motion of the balance does not depend on weights
in the scales; at least, as much as if the balance should move itself, when there is no weight
in either scale. And the activity of the balance which is sufficient to move itself against the
greater weight, must certainly be more than sufficient to move it when there is no weight
at all.
Mr. Chubb supposes, that the Will cannot stir at all without some Motive; and also
supposes, that if there be a Motive to one thing, and none to the contrary, volition will infal-
libly follow that Motive. This is virtually to suppose an entire dependence of the Will on
Motives; if it were not wholly dependent on them, it could surely help itself a little without
them; or help itself a little against a Motive, without help from the strength and weight of a
contrary Motive. And yet his supposing that the Will, when it has before it various opposite
Motives, can use them as it pleases, and choose its own influence from them, and neglect
the strongest, and follow the weakest, supposes it to be wholly independent on Motives.
It further appears, on Mr. Chubb’s hypothesis, that volition must be without any previous
ground in any Motive, thus: if it be, as he supposes, that the Will is not determined by any
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SECTION X. Volition necessarily connected with the influence of Motives;…