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On the Soul and the Resurrection.
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Argument.
The mind, in times of bereavement, craves a certainty gained by reasoning as to the
existence of the soul after death.
First, then: Virtue will be impossible, if deprived of the life of eternity, her only advantage.
But this is a moral argument. The case calls for speculative and scientific treatment.
How is the objection that the nature of the soul, as of real things, is material, to be met?
Thus; the truth of this doctrine would involve the truth of Atheism; whereas Atheism
is refuted by the fact of the wise order that reigns in the world. In other words, the spirituality
of God cannot be denied: and this proves the possibility of spiritual or immaterial existence:
and therefore, that of the soul.
But is God, then, the same thing as the soul?
No: but man is “a little world in himself;” and we may with the same right conclude
from this Microcosm to the actual existence of an immaterial soul, as from the phenomena
of the world to the reality of God’s existence.
A Definition of the soul is then given, for the sake of clearness in the succeeding discus-
sion. It is a created, living, intellectual being, with the power, as long as it is provided with
organs, of sensuous perception. For “the mind sees,” not the eye; take, for instance, the
meaning of the phases of the moon. The objection that the “organic machine” of the body
produces all thought is met by the instance of the water-organ. Such machines, if thought
were really an attribute of matter, ought to build themselves spontaneously: whereas they
are a direct proof of an invisible thinking power in man. A work of Art means mind: there
is a thing perceived, and a thing not perceived.
But still, what is this thing not perceived?
If it has no sensible quality whatever—Where is it?
The answer is, that the same question might be asked about the Deity (Whose existence
is not denied).
Then the Mind and the Deity are identical?
Not so: in its substantial existence, as separable from matter, the soul is like God; but
this likeness does not extend to sameness; it resembles God as a copy the original.
As being “simple and uncompounded” the soul survives the dissolution of the composite
body, whose scattered elements it will continue to accompany, as if watching over its property
till the Resurrection, when it will clothe itself in them anew.
The soul was defined “an intellectual being.” But anger and desire are not of the body
either. Are there, then, two or three souls?—Answer. Anger and desire do not belong to the
essence of the soul, but are only among its varying states; they are not originally part of
ourselves, and we can and must rid ourselves of them, and bring them, as long as they con-
On the Soul and the Resurrection.Argument.
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On the Soul and the Resurrection.