Chapter XIII
.—
That there is a
Necessary Difference between Created Things. That the Propensity to
Good and Evil depends on the Will of Man; and that, consequently,
Judgment is a Necessary and Reasonable Thing.
There
are, indeed, some who venture with childish presumption to find
fault with God in respect of this also, and ask why it is that he has
not created one and the same natural disposition for all, but rather
has ordained the existence of many things different, nay, contrary in
their nature, whence arises the dissimilarity of our moral conduct and
character. Would it not (say they) have been better, both as regards
obedience to the commands of God, and a just apprehension of himself,
and for the confirmation of individual faith, that all mankind should
be of the same moral character? It is indeed ridiculous to expect that
this could be the case, and to forget that the constitution of the
world is different from that of the things that are in the world; that
physical and moral objects are not identical in their nature, nor the
affections of the body the same as those of the soul. [For the immortal
soul far exceeds the material world in dignity, and is more blessed
than the perishable and terrestrial creation, in proportion as it is
noble and more allied to God.
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] Nor is the
human race excluded from participation in the divine goodness; though
this is not the lot of all indiscriminately, but of those only who
search deeply into the Divine nature, and propose the knowledge of
sacred things as the leading object of their lives.
3438
[The text of this passage is defective. The conjectural
restoration of Valesius, which seems probable, is chiefly
followed.—
Bag.
] Heinichen, like Christophorson and Savil
before him, “does not hesitate,” with one of the
mss.
, to omit this passage.