should be transferred to what is loftier. But what more Divine sense could we find in the
appellation of “Son,” if we were to reject, according to our adversaries’ view, the natural re-
lation to Him that begat Him? I presume no one is so daring in impiety as to think that, in
speech concerning the Divine nature, what is humble and mean is more appropriate than
what is lofty and great. If they can discover, therefore, any sense of more exalted character
than this, so that to be of the nature of the Father seems a thing unworthy to conceive of
the Only-begotten, let them tell us whether they know, in their secret wisdom, anything
more exalted than the nature of the Father, that, in raising the Only-begotten God to this
level, they should lift Him also above His relation to the Father. But if the majesty of the
Divine nature transcends all height, and excels every power that calls forth our wonder,
what idea remains that can carry the meaning of the name “Son” to something greater still?
Since it is acknowledged, therefore, that every significant phrase employed of the Only-be-
gotten, even if the name be derived from the ordinary use of our lower life, is properly applied
to Him with a difference of sense in the direction of greater majesty, and if it is shown that
we can find no more noble conception of the title “Son” than that which presents to us the
reality of His relationship to Him that begat Him, I think that we need spend no more time
on this topic, as our argument has sufficiently shown that it is not proper to interpret the
title of “Son” in like manner with the other names.
But we must bring back our enquiry once more to the book. It does not become the
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same persons “not to refuse” (for I will use their own words) “to call Him that is generated
a ‘product of generation,’ since both the generated essence itself and the appellation of Son
make such a relation of words appropriate,” and again to change the names which naturally
belong to Him into metaphorical interpretations: so that one of two things has befallen
them,—either their first attack has failed, and it is in vain that they fly to “natural order” to
establish the necessity of calling Him that is generated a “product of generation”; or, if this
argument holds good, they will find their second argument brought to nought by what they
have already established. For the person who is called a “product of generation” because He
is generated, cannot, for the very same reason, be possibly called a “product of making,” or
a “product of creation.” For the sense of the several terms differs very widely, and one who
uses his phrases advisedly ought to employ words with due regard to the subject, that we
may not, by improperly interchanging the sense of our phrases, fall into any confusion of
ideas. Hence we call that which is wrought out by a craft the work of the craftsman, and call
him who is begotten by a man that man’s son; and no sane person would call the work a
son, or the son a work; for that is the language of one who confuses and obscures the true
sense by an erroneous use of names. It follows that we must truly affirm of the Only-begotten
one of these two things,—if He is a Son, that He is not to be called a “product of creation,”
and if He is created, that He is alien from the appellation of “Son603,” just as heaven and
603 Oehler’s punctuation here seems faulty, and is accordingly not followed.
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Then he ends the book with an exposition of the Divine and Human names of…