If it should be objected, that these things make all moral Inability equal, and suppose
men morally unable to will otherwise than they actually do will, in all cases, and equally so
in every instance.—In answer to this objection, I desire two things may be observed.
First, That if by being equally unable, be meant, as really unable; then, so far as the In-
ability is merely moral, it is true; the Will, in every instance, acts by moral necessity, and is
morally unable to act otherwise, as truly and properly in one case as another; as, I humbly
conceive, has been perfectly and abundantly demonstrated by what has been said in the
preceding part of this essay. But yet, in some respect, the Inability may be said to be greater
in some instances than others: though the man may be truly unable, (if moral Inability can
truly be called Inability,) yet he may be further from being able to do some things than
others. As it is in things, which men are naturally unable to do. A person, whose strength
is no more than sufficient to lift the weight of one hundred pounds, is as truly and really
unable to lift one hundred and one pounds, as ten thousand pounds; but yet he is further
from being able to lift the latter weight than the former; and so, according to the common
use of speech, has a greater Inability for it. So it is in moral Inability. A man is truly morally
unable to choose contrary to a present inclination, which in the least degree prevails; or,
contrary to that motive, which, all things considered, has strength and advantage now to
move the Will, in the least degree, superior to all other motives in view: but yet he is further
from ability to resist a very strong habit, and a violent and deeply rooted inclination, or a
motive vastly exceeding all others in strength. And again, the Inability may, in some respects,
be called greater in some instances than others, as it may be more general and extensive to
all acts of that kind. So men may be said to be unable in a different sense, and to be further
from moral ability, who have that moral Inability which is general and habitual, than they
who have only that Inability which is occasional and particular. 133 Thus in cases of natural
Inability; he that is born blind may be said to be unable to see, in a different manner, and
is, in some respects, further from being able to see, than he whose sight is hindered by a
transient cloud or mist.
And besides, that which was observed in the first part of this discourse, concerning the
Inability which attends a strong and settled habit, should be there remembered; viz. that a
fixed habit is attended with this peculiar moral Inability, by which it is distinguished from
occasional volition, namely, that endeavours to avoid future volitions of that kind, which
are agreeable to such a habit, much more frequently and commonly prove vain and insuffi-
cient. For though it is impossible there should be any sincere endeavours against a present
choice, yet there may be against volitions of that kind, when viewed at a distance. A person
may desire and use means to prevent future exercises of a certain inclination; and, in order
to it, may wish the habit might be removed; but his desires and endeavours may be ineffec-
133 See this distinction of moral Inability explained in Part. Sect. IV.
649
SECTION IV. Command and Obligation of Obedience, consistent with moral…