teaching of Berkeley. There is a passage in the De Animâ et Resurrectione where he deals
with the question how an intelligent Being could have created matter, which is neither intel-
ligent or intelligible. But what if matter is only a concourse of qualities, ἔννοιαι, or ψιλὰ
νοήματα as he elsewhere calls them? Then there would be no difficulty in understanding
the manner of creation. But even about this we can say so much, i.e. that not one of those
things which we attribute to body is itself body: neither figure, nor colour, nor weight, nor
extension, nor quantity, nor any other qualifying notion whatever: but every one of them
is a thought: it is the combination of them all into a single whole that constitutes body. Seeing,
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then, that these several qualifications which complete the particular body are grasped by
thought alone, and not by sense, and that the Deity is a thinking being, what trouble can it
be to such a thinking agent to produce the thoughts whose mutual combination generate
for us the substance of that body? and in the treatise, De Hom. Opif., c. 24, the intelligible
φύσις is said to produce the intelligible δυνάμεις, and the concourse of these δυνάμεις brings
into being the material nature. The body itself, he repeats (contra Fatum, p. 67), is not a real
substance; it is a soulless, unsubstantial thing. The only real creation is that of spirits. Even
Origen did not go so far as that Matter with him, though it exists by concomitance and not
by itself, nevertheless really exists. He avoided a rock upon which Gregory runs; for with
Gregory not only matter but created spirit as well vanish in idealism. There remain with
him only the νοούμενα and God.
This transcendent idealism embarrasses him in many ways, and makes his theory of
the soul full of inconsistency. (1) He will not say unhesitatingly whether that pure humanity
in the beginning created in the image of God had a body or not like ours. Origen at all events
says that the eternally pre-existing spirits were invested with a body, even before falling into
the sensible world. But Gregory, while denying the pre-existence of souls in the sense of
Origen, yet in many of his treatises, especially in the De Hom. Opificio, seems to point to a
primitive humanity, a predeterminate number of souls destined to live in the body though
they had not yet lived, which goes far beyond Origen’s in its ideal character. “When Moses,”
Gregory says, “speaks of the soul as the image of God, he shows that all that is alien to God
must be excluded from our definition of the soul; and a corporal nature is alien to God.”
He points out that God first ‘made man in His own image,’ and after that made them male
and female; so that there was a double fashioning of our nature, ἥ τε πρὸς τὸ θεῖον
ὁμοιωμένη, ἥ τε πρὸς τὴν διαφορὰν ταύτην (i.e. male and female) διηρημένη. On the other
hand, in the Oratio Catechetica, which contains certainly his more dogmatic statement on
every point, this ideal and passionless humanity is regarded as still in the future: and it is
represented that man’s double-nature is actually the very centre of the Divine Councils, and
not the result of any mistake or sin; man’s soul from the very first was commingled
(ἀνάκρασις is Gregory’s favourite word) with a body, in order that in him, as representing
every stage of living things, the whole creation, even in its lowest part, might share in the
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His Origenism.