God.’ He26 allows them, of course, to have been created in the Scriptural sense of that word,
which is certainly an advance upon Justin; but his creation is not that distinct event in time
which Christianity requires and the exacter treatment of the nature of the Divine Persons
had now developed. His creation, both the intelligible and visible world, receives from him
an eternity which is unnatural and incongruous in relation to his other speculations and
beliefs: it lingers, Tithonus-like, in the presence of the Divine Persons, without any meaning
and purpose for its life; it is the last relic of Paganism, as it were, in a system which is other-
wise Christian to the very core. His strenuous effort to banish all ideas of time, at all events
from the intelligible world, ended in this eternal creation of that world; which seemed to
join the eternally generated Son too closely to it, and gave occasion to the Arians to say that
He too was a κτίσμα. This eternal pre-existence in fact almost destroyed the idea of creation,
and made the Deity in a way dependent on His own world. Athanasius, therefore, and his
followers were roused to separate the divinity of the Son from everything created. The relation
of the world to God could no longer be explained in the same terms as those which they
employed to illustrate the relations between the Divine Persons; and when once the doctrine
of the consubstantiality of the Father and Son had been accepted and firmly established
there could be no more favour shown by the defenders of that doctrine to the merely Platonic
view of the nature and origin of souls and of matter.
Amongst the defenders of the Creed of Nicæa, Gregory, we know, stands well-nigh
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foremost. In his long and numerous treatises on the Trinity he employs every possible argu-
ment and illustration to show the contents of the substance of the Deity as transcendent,
incommunicable to creation per se. Souls cannot have the attributes of Deity. Created spirits
cannot claim immediate kindred with the Λόγος. So instead of the Platonic antithesis of the
intelligible and sensible world, which Origen adopted, making all equal in the intelligible
world, he brings forward the antithesis of God and the world. He felt too that that antithesis
answers more fully not only to the needs of the Faith in the Trinity daily growing more exact
and clear, but also to the facts of the Creation, i.e. its variety and differences. He gives up
the preexistence of the rational soul; it will not explain the infinite variety observable in
souls. The variety, again, of the material world, full as it is of the miracles of divine power,
cannot have been the result of the chance acts of created natures embodying themselves
therein, which the theory of pre-existence supposes. God and the created world (of spirits
and matter) are now to be the factors in theology; although Gregory does now and then, for
mere purposes of illustration, divide the Universe still into the intelligible and the sensible.
When once pre-existence was given up, the parts of the soul could be more closely united
to each other, because the lower and higher were in their beginning no longer separated by
a gulf of ages. Accordingly Gregory, reducing the three parts of man which Origen had used
26 In Joann., tom. 32, 18.
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His Origenism.