might be thereby lessened. And yet is there any one so narrow-minded as to reckon the
Blessed Deity Himself as not free from the passion of envy? What plausible reason, then, is
left why the Supreme Deity should have constituted such an ‘order’ in the case of the Son
and the Spirit? “But I did not mean that ‘order’ to come from Him,” he rejoins. But whence
else, if the beings to which this ‘order’ is connatural are not essentially related to each other?
But perhaps he calls the inferiority itself of the being of the Son and of the Spirit this ‘con-
natural order.’ But I would beg of him to tell me the reason of this very thing, viz., why the
Son is inferior on the score of being, when both this being and energy are to be discovered
in the same characteristics and attributes. If on the other hand there is not to be the same162
definition of being and energy, and each is to signify something different, why does he in-
troduce a demonstration of the thing in question by means of that which is quite different
from it? It would be, in that case, just as if, when it was debated with regard to man’s own
being whether he were a risible animal, or one capable of being taught to read, some one
was to adduce the building of a house or ship on the part of a mason or a shipwright as a
settling of the question, insisting on the skilful syllogism that we know beings by operations,
and a house and a ship are operations of man. Do we then learn, most simple sir, by such
premisses, that man is risible as well as broad-nailed? Some one might well retort; ‘whether
man possesses motion and energy was not the question: it was, what is the energizing prin-
ciple itself; and that I fail to learn from your way of deciding the question.’ Indeed, if we
wanted to know something about the nature of the wind, you would not give a satisfactory
answer by pointing to a heap of sand or chaff raised by the wind, or to dust which it scattered:
for the account to be given of the wind is quite different: and these illustrations of yours
would be foreign to the subject. What ground, then, has he for attempting to explain beings
by their energies, and making the definition of an entity out of the resultants of that entity.
Let us observe, too, what sort of work of the Father it is by which the Father’s being,
according to him, is to be comprehended. The Son most certainly, he will say, if he says as
usual. But this Son of yours, most learned sir, is commensurate in your scheme only with
the energy which produced Him, and indicates that alone, while the Object of our search
still keeps in the dark, if, as you yourself confess, this energy is only one amongst the things
which ‘follow163’ the first being. This energy, as you say, extends itself into the work which
it produces, but it does not reveal therein even its own nature, but only so much of it as we
can get a glimpse of in that work. All the resources of a smith are not set in motion to make
a gimlet; the skill of that artisan only operates so far as is adequate to form that tool, though
162 Reading αὑτὸς; instead of Oehler’s αὐτὸς.
163 only one thing amongst the things which follow, &c. The Latin translation is manifestly wrong here, “si
recte a te assertum est, iis etiam quæ ad primam substantiam sequuntur aliquam operationem inesse.” The Greek
is εἴπερ ἡ ἐνέργεια τῶν παρεπομένων τις εἶναι τῇ πρώτη οὐσία μεμαρτύρηται
140
He falsely imagines that we can have an unalterable series of harmonious…