SECT. II.
The Falseness and Inconsistence of that metaphysical notion of Action, and Agency, which
seems to be generally entertained by the defenders of the Arminian Doctrine concerning Liberty,
moral Agency, &c.
One thing, that is made very much a ground of argument and supposed demonstration
by Arminians, in defense of the forementioned principles, concerning moral Agency, virtue,
vice, &c., is their metaphysical notion of Agency and Action. They say, unless the soul has
a self-determining power, it has no power of Action; if its volitions be not caused by itself,
but are excited and determined by some extrinsic cause, they cannot be the soul’s own acts;
and that the soul cannot be active, but must be wholly passive, in those effects which it is
the subject of necessarily, and not from its own free determination.
Mr. Chubb lays the foundation of his scheme of Liberty, and of his arguments to support
it, very much in this position, that man is an Agent, and capable of Action. Which doubtless
is true: but self-determination belongs to his notion of Action, and is the very essence of it.
Whence he infers, that it is impossible for a man to act and be acted upon, in the same thing,
at the same time; and that no Action can be the effect of the Action of another: and he insists,
that a necessary Agent, or an Agent that is necessarily determined to act, is a plain contradic-
tion. 138
138 Were the human mind, indeed, not the subject of either passive power, on the one hand, as the predisposing
cause of vice; or of divine holy influence, on the other, as the predisposing cause of real virtue; and were the
determining motive what some have represented it to be, the object itself, irrespective of the changeable state
of mind perceiving it; the objection, that “a necessary agent is a plain contradiction,” or, in other words, that
man is no proper agent, would be unanswerable. For the rank and place of man in creation, and his relative
circumstances in the arrangement of providence, being the result of decretive appointment, if he himself were
not liable to any change but by the same appointment, it would follow, that if the objects themselves determined
him to choose, and to choose always according to the strongest motive, his very volitions in the acts themselves
would be necessitated decretively, to the exclusion of all hypothetical or moral possibility of failure; and therefore
could never be erroneous, any more than the first cause could act erroneously. On such principles, moral evil,
vice or fault, could have no existence. No effect cold be otherwise than good, amiable, and perfectly innocent;
a moral possibility of failure being excluded by natural necessity. For the volition itself to be so necessitated,
and not in a moral or hypothetical manner only, is the same thing as giving it no opportunity of choice or
preference, or constraining it to choose one way by a settled purpose, with a natural impossibility of acting
otherwise. But if every act of man be thus the result of settled purpose, why should he be blamed for any one
act whatever? He does nothing but what he is constrained, or decretively necessitated to perform, the contrary
being rendered naturally impossible; and if he deserves no praise, he can incur no blame, any more than a clock
for not keeping time. Such a necessary agent would be indeed a plain contradiction. There is much reason to
apprehend that some philosophical necessarians have no better notion of agency than that which Mr. Chubb
charges, and justly charges, with “a plain contradiction.” For those who hold the sentiment, that every act, even
SECTION II. The Falseness and Inconsistence of that metaphysical notion of Action, and Agency, which seems to be generally entertained by the defenders of the Arminian Doctrine concerning Liberty, moral Agency, &c.
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SECTION II. The Falseness and Inconsistence of that metaphysical notion…