CHAP. Ill] THE GOOD, AND GOOD THINGS, TO BEDISTINGUISHED. 205
its hills, and the level surface of its plains ; and good is an
estate that is pleasant and fertile ; and good is a house that is
arranged in due proportions, and is spacious and bright ; and
good are animal and animate bodies ; and good is air that is
temperate and salubrious ; and good is food that is agreeable
and fit for health ; and good is health, without pains or lassi-
tude ; and good is the countenance of man that is disposed in
fit proportions, and is cheerful in look, and bright in colour
;
and good is the mind of a friend, with the sweetness of agree-
ment, and with the confidence of love ; and good is a righteous
man ; and good are riches, since they are readily useful ; and
good is the heaven, with its sun, and moon, and stars ; and
good are the angels, by their holy obedience ; and good is
discourse that sweetly teaches and suitably admonishes the
hearer ; and good is a poem that is harmonious in its numbers
and weighty in its sense. And why add yet more and more ?
This thing is good and that good, but take away this and that,
and regard good itself if thou canst ; so wilt thou see God, not
good by a good that is other than Himself, but the good of all
good. For in all these good things, whether those which I have
mentioned, or any else that are to be discerned or thought,
we could not say that one was better than another, when we
judge truly, unless a conception of the good itself had been
impressed upon us, such that according to it we might both
approve some things as good, and prefer one good to another.
So God is to be loved, not this and that good, but the good
itself. For the good that must be sought for the soul is not
one above which it is to fly by judging, but to which it is to
cleave by loving ; and what can this be except God ? ISTot a
good mind, or a good angel, or the good heaven, but the good
good. For perhaps what I wish to say may be more easily
perceived in this way. For when, for instance, a mind is
called good, as there are two words, so from these w^ords I
understand two things—one whereby it is mind, and another
whereby it is good. And itself had no share in making itself
a mind, for there was nothing as yet to make itself to be any-
thing ; but to make itself to be a good mind, I see, must be
brought about by the will : not because that by which it is
mind is not itself anything good ;—for how else is it already