up to evil as the consequence, then the persons, who are the subjects of this judgment, must
be the subjects of such an event, and so the event is necessary.
If not only coaction, but all Necessity, will prove men blameless, then Judas was blameless,
after Christ had given him over, and had already declared his certain damnation, and that
he should verily betray him. He was guilty of no sin in betraying his Master, on this suppos-
ition; though his so doing is spoken of by Christ as the most aggravated sin, more heinous
than the sin of Pilate in crucifying him. And the Jews in Egypt, in Jeremiah’s time, were guilty
of no sin, in their not worshiping the true God, after God had “sworn by his great name,
that his name should be no more named in the mouth of any man of Judah, in all the land
of Egypt,” (Jer. xliv. 26.
Dr. Whitby (Disc. on five Points, p. 302, 303.) denies, that men, in this world, are ever
so given up by God to sin, that their Wills should be necessarily determined to evil; though
he owns, that hereby it may become exceeding difficult for men to do good, having a strong
bent and powerful inclination to what is evil.—But if we should allow the case to be just as
he represents, the judgment of giving up to sin will no better agree with his notions of that
liberty, which is essential to praise or blame, than if we should suppose it to render the
avoiding of sin impossible. For if an impossibility of avoiding sin wholly excuses a man; then
for the same reason, its being difficult to avoid it, excuses him in part; and this just in pro-
portion to the degree of difficulty.—If the influence of moral impossibility or inability be
the same, to excuse persons in not doing or not avoiding any thing, as that of natural inab-
ility, (which is supposed,) then undoubtedly, in like manner, mortal difficulty has the same
influence to excuse with natural difficulty. But all allow, that natural impossibility wholly
excuses, and also that natural difficulty excuses in part, and makes the act or omission less
blamable in proportion to the difficulty. All natural difficulty, according to the plainest
dictates of the light of nature, excuses in some degree, so that the neglect is not so blamable,
as if there had been no difficulty in the case: and so the greater the difficulty is, still the more
excusable, in proportion to the increase of the difficulty. And as natural impossibility wholly
excuses, and excludes all blame, so the nearer the difficulty approaches to impossibility, still
the nearer a person is to blamelessness in proportion to that approach. And if the case of
moral impossibility or Necessity, be just the same with natural Necessity or coaction, as to
its influence to excuse a neglect, then also, for the same reason, the case of natural difficulty
does not differ in influence, to excuse a neglect, from moral difficulty, arising from a strong
bias or bent to evil, such as Dr. Whitby owns in the case of those that are given up to their
own hearts’ lusts. So that the fault of such persons must be lessened, in proportion to the
difficulty, and approach to impossibility. If ten degrees of moral difficulty make the action
quite impossible, and so wholly excuse, then if there be nine degrees of difficulty, the person
is in great part excused, and is nine degrees in ten less blameworthy, than if there had been
no difficulty at all; and he has but one degree of blameworthiness. The reason is plain, on
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SECTION III. The case of such as are given up of God to sin, and of fallen…