termining its own acts, and for liberty of Will consisting in self-determining power; they
do nothing but confound themselves and others with words without a meaning. In the
question, What determines the Will? and in their answer, that the Will determines itself; and
in all the dispute, it seems to be taken for granted, that something determines the Will; and
the controversy on this head is not, whether its determination has any cause or foundation
at all; but where the foundation of it is, whether in the will itself, or somewhere else. But if
the thing intended be what is above mentioned, then nothing at all determines the Will;
volition having absolutely no cause or foundation of its existence, either within or
without.—There is a great noise made about self-determining power, as the source of all
free acts of the Will: but when the matter comes to be explained, the meaning is, that no
power at all is the source of these acts, neither self-determining power, nor any other, but
they arise from nothing; no cause, no power, no influence, being at all concerned in the
matter.
However, this very thing, even that the free acts of the Will are events which come to
pass without a cause, is certainly implied in the Arminian notion of liberty of Will; though
it be very inconsistent with many other things in their scheme, and repugnant to some things
implied in their notion of liberty. Their opinion implies, that the particular determination
of volition is without any cause; because they hold the free acts of the Will to be contingent
events; and contingence is essential to freedom in their notion of it. But certainly, those
things which have a prior ground and reason of their particular existence, a cause which
antecedently determines them to be, and determines them to be just as they are, do not
happen contingently. If something foregoing, by a casual influence and connexion, determines
and fixes precisely their coming to pass, and the manner of it, then it does not remain a
contingent thing whether they shall come to pass or no.
And because it is a question in many respects very important in this controversy,
Whether the free acts of the Will are events which come to pass without a cause; I shall be
particular in examining this point in the two following sections.
549
SECTION II. Several supposed ways of evading the foregoing reasoning, considered.…