SECT. XI.
The impertinence of arguments, that are in like manner against the schemes of both the
controverting parties: And this exemplified in what Mr. W. says concerning the notion of Israel
being the people of God, and his manner of arguing concerning the members of the primitive
christian church.
Inasmuch as in each of the remaining instances of Mr. W.‘s arguing, that I shall take
notice of, he insists upon and urges arguments which are in like manner against his own
scheme, as against mine, I desire, that such a way of arguing may be a little particularly
considered.
And here I would lay down this as a maxim of undoubted verity; That an argument,
brought to support one scheme against another, can avail nothing to the. purpose it is brought
for, if it is at the same time against the scheme it would support, in like manner as against
that which it would destroy.
It is an old and approved maxim, That argument which proves too much, proves nothing,
i. e. If it proves too much for him that brings it—proves against himself in like manner as
against his opponent—then it is nothing to help his cause.—The reason of it is plain: the
business of a dispute is to make one cause good against another, to make one scale heavier
than the other. But when a man uses an argument which takes alike out of both scales, this
does not at all serve to make his side preponderate, but leaves the balance just as it was.
Arguments brought by any man in a dispute, if they be not altogether impertinent, are
against the difference between him and his opponent, or against his opponent’s differing
from him: for wherein there is no difference, there is no dispute.—But that can be no argument
against his opponent differing from him, which is only an argument against what is common
to both, and taken from some difficulty that both sides equally share in. If I charge supposed
absurdities or difficulties against him that differs from me, as an argument to show the un-
reasonableness of his differing; and yet the difficulty is not owing to his differing from me,
inasmuch as the same would lie against him, if he agreed with me, my conduct herein is
both very impertinent and injurious.
If one in a dispute insists on an argument, that lies equally against his own scheme as
the other, and yet will stand to it that his argument is good, he in effect stands to that his
own scheme is not good; he supplants himself, and gives up his own cause, in opposing his
adversary; in holding fast his argument, he holds fast what is his own overthrow; and in in-
sisting that his argument is solid and strong, he in effect insists that his own scheme is weak
and vain. If my antagonist will insist upon it, that his argument is good, that he brings against
me, which is in like manner against himself; then I may take the same argument, in my turn,
and use it against him, and he can have nothing to answer; but has stopped his own mouth,
having owned the argument to be conclusive.—Now such sort of arguments as these Mr.
W. abundantly uses.
SECTION XI. Arguments hostile to both sides
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SECTION XI. Arguments hostile to both sides