CHAP. IV.J ESSENTIAL EXISTENCE OF LOVE AND KNOWLEDGE. 227
fully known, then knowledge is not perfect; but if it is
greater, then the nature which knows is above that which is
known, as the knowledge of the body is greater than the body
itself, which is known by that knowledge. For knowledge is
a kind of life in the reason of the knower ; but the body is not
life ; and any life is greater than any body, not in bulk, but
in power. But when the mind knows itself, its own know-
ledge does not rise above itself, because itself knows, and itself
is known. When, therefore, it knows itself entirely, and no
other thing with itself, then its knowledge is equal to itself;
because its knowledge is not from another nature, since it
knows itself. And when it perceives itself entirely, and
nothing more, then it is neither less nor greater. We said
therefore rightly, that these three things, when they are perfect,
are by consequence equal.
5. Similar reasoning suggests to us, if indeed we can any
way understand the matter, that these things exist in the soul,
and that, being as it were involved in it, they are so evolved
from it as to be perceived and reckoned up substantially, or,
so to say, essentially. Not as though in a subject, as colour, or
shape, or any other quality or quantity, are in the body. For
anything of this kind does not go beyond the subject in which
it is ; for that colour or shape of this particular body cannot
be also those of another body. But the mind can also love
something besides itself, with that love with which it loves
itself. And further, the mind does not know itself only, but
also many other things. Wherefore love and knowledge are
not contained in the mind as in a subject, but these also exist
substantially, as the mind itself does ; because, even if they
are mutually predicated relatively, yet they exist each seve-
rally in their own substance. Nor are they so mutually
predicated relatively as colour and the coloured subject are
;
so that colour is in the coloured subject, but has not any
proper substance in itself, since coloured body is a substance,
but colour is in a substance ; but as two friends are also two
men, which are substances, while they are said to be men not
relatively, but friends relatively.
6. But, further, although one who loves or one who knows
is a substance, and knowledge is a substance, and love is a