and such Sensations, which are the only ideal that they are capable of, that are not active
about their ideas: for former is a Will that is active about its own ideas, in disposing of them
among themselves, or Appetite towards those ideas that are acquired by such action.
The Association of ideas in Beasts, seems to be much quicker and stronger than in Men:
at least in many of them.
It would not suppose any exalted faculty in Beasts, to suppose that like ideas in them,
if they have any, excite one another. Nor can I think why it should be so any the less for the
weakness and narrowness of their faculties; in such things, where to perceive the argument
of ideas, requires neither attention nor comprehension. And experience teaches us, that
what we call thought in them, is thus led from one thing to another.
[17.] Logic. One reason why, at first, before I knew other Logic, I used to be mightily
pleased with the study of the Old Logic, was, because it was very pleasant to see my thoughts,
that before lay in my mind jumbled without any distinction, ranged into order and distributed
into classes and subdivisions, so that I could tell where they all belonged, and run them up
to their general heads. For this Logic consisted much in Distributions and Definitions; and
their maxims gave occasion to observe new and strange dependencies of ideas, and a
seeming agreement of multitudes of them in the same thing, that I never observed before.
[66.] Ideas. All sorts of ideas of things are but the repetitions of those very things over
again—as well the ideas of colours, figures, solidity, tastes, and smells, as the ideas of thought
and mental acts.
[67.] Love is not properly said to be an idea, any more than Understanding is said to be
an idea. Understanding and Loving are different acts of the mind entirely; and so Pleasure
and Pain are not properly ideas.
Though Pleasure and Pain may imply perception in their nature, yet it does not follow,
that they are properly ideas. There is an Act of the mind in it. An idea is only a perception,
wherein the mind is passive, or rather subjective. The Acts of the mind are not merely ideas.
All Acts of the mind, about its ideas, are not themselves mere ideas.
Pleasure and Pain have their seat in the Will, and not in the Understanding. The Will,
Choice, &c. is nothing else, but the mind’s being pleased with an idea, or having a superior
pleasedness in something thought of, or a desire of a future thing, or a pleasedness in the
thought of our union with the thing, or a pleasedness in such a state of ourselves, and a degree
of pain while we are not in that state, or a disagreeable conception of the contrary state at
that time when we desire it.
[7.] Genus. The various distributing and ranking of things, and tying of them together,
under one common abstract idea, is, although arbitrary, yet exceedingly useful, and indeed
absolutely necessary: for how miserable should we be, if we could think of things only indi-
vidually, as the beasts do; how slow, narrow, painful, and endless would be the exercise of
thought.
483
NO.IV. Remarks in Mental Philosophy. The Mind.