How it is possible, then, to assign one’s gratuities to the non-subsistent, let this man,
who claims to be using words and phrases in their natural force, explain to the followers of
his error. I would not, however, have mentioned this at all, if it had not placed a necessity
upon me of proving our author’s weakness both in thought and expression. As for all the
passages from the inspired writings which he drags in, though quite unconnected with his
object, formulating thereby a difference of immortality1208 in angels and in men, I do not
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know what he has in his eye, or what he hopes to prove by them, and I pass them by. The
immortal, as long as it is immortal, admits of no degrees of more and less arising from
comparison. For if the one member of the comparison is, by the force of contrast, to suffer
a diminution or privation as regards its immortality, it must needs be that such a member
is not to be called immortal at all; for how can that be called absolutely immortal in which
mortality is detected by this juxtaposition and comparison? And to think of that fine hair-
splitting of his, in not allowing the idea of privation to be unvarying and general, but in as-
serting, on the contrary, that while separation from good things is privation, the absence of
bad things is not to be marked by that term! If he is to get his way here, he will take the truth
from the Apostle’s words, which say that He “only hath immortality1209,” which He gives
to others. What this newly-imported dictum of his has to do with his preceding argument,
neither we nor any one else amongst reflecting people are able to understand. Yet because
we have not the mental strength to take in these scientific subtleties, he calls us “unscientific
both in our judgment as to objects, and in our use of terms”; those are his very words. But
all this, as having no power to shake the truth, I pass over without further notice; and also
how he misrepresents the view we have expounded of the imperishable, and of the unem-
bodied, namely, that of these terms the latter signifies the undimensional, where the threefold
extension belonging to all bodies is not to be found, and the former signifies that which is
not receptive of destruction: and also how he says, that “we do not think it right to let the
shape of these words be lost by extending them to ideas inapplicable to them, or to imagine
that each of them is indicative of something not present or not accruing; but rather we think
they are indicative of the actual essence”; all this I deem worthy only of silence and deep
oblivion, and leave to the reader to detect for himself their mingled folly and blasphemy.
He actually asserts that the perishable is not opposed to the imperishable, and that the
1208 But there are two meanings of ἀθάνατος,—and of these perhaps Eunomius was thinking,—i.e. 1. Not
dead; 2. Immortal. In Plato’s Phædo there is an argument for the immortality of the soul, certainly not the
strongest one, drawn from this. It is assumed there that the thing, whose nature is such that so long as it exists
it neither is nor can be dead, can never cease to exist i.e. the soul by virtue of not actually dying, though capable
of death, is immortal. Perhaps this accounts for Eunomius saying (lower down) that “the perishable is not opposed
to the imperishable.”
1209 1 Tim. vi. 16.
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Answer to Eunomius' Second Book.