Testimonia

{"author":null,"backreferences":[{"context_html":"<p class=\"c005\">3. But since a rational animal not only has within itself\r\nthese natural movements, but has moreover, to a greater extent\r\nthan other animals, the power of reason, by which it can\r\njudge and determine regarding natural movements, and disapprove\r\nand reject some, while approving and adopting others,\r\nso by the judgment of this reason may the movements of men\r\nbe governed and directed towards a commendable life. And\r\nfrom this it follows that, since the nature of this reason which\r\nis in man has within itself the power of distinguishing between\r\ngood and evil, and while distinguishing possesses the faculty\r\nof selecting what it has approved, it may justly be deemed\r\nworthy of praise in choosing what is good, and deserving of\r\ncensure in following that which is base or wicked. This indeed\r\nmust by no means escape our notice, that in some dumb\r\nanimals there is found a more regular movement<a id=\"r366\"></a><a class=\"c007 pginternal\" href=\"#f366\"><sup>[366]</sup></a> than in\r\nothers, as in hunting-dogs or war-horses, so that they may\r\nappear to some to be moved by a kind of rational sense. But\r\nwe must believe this to be the result not so much of reason as\r\nof some natural instinct,<a id=\"r367\"></a><a class=\"c007 pginternal\" href=\"#f367\"><sup>[367]</sup></a> largely bestowed for purposes of\r\nthat kind. Now, as we had begun to remark, seeing that\r\nsuch is the nature of a rational animal, some things may\r\nhappen to us human beings from without; and these, coming\r\nin contact with our sense of sight, or hearing, or any other of\r\nour senses, may incite and arouse us to good movements, or\r\nthe contrary; and seeing they come to us from an external\r\nsource, it is not within our own power to prevent their coming.\r\nBut to determine and approve what use we ought to\r\nmake of those things which thus happen, is the duty of no\r\nother than of that reason within us, <i>i.e.</i> of our own judgment;\r\nby the decision of which reason we use the incitement,\r\nwhich comes to us from without for that purpose, which reason\r\napproves, our natural movements being determined by its\r\nauthority either to good actions or the reverse.</p>","headings":["The Writings of Origen, Vol. 1 of 2","ORIGEN DE PRINCIPIIS.","BOOK III.","FROM THE LATIN."],"marker_anchor":null,"paragraph_id":"pg70561-paragraph-201"}],"canonical_references":[],"date_end":null,"date_start":null,"deduplication_fingerprint":"94e6e27892b9fbe148b0f8196f112614b2476051671d8079aa6627f696349625","edition_title":"The writings of Origen, Vol. 1 (of 2)","edition_translators":["Frederick Crombie"],"edition_year":1869,"explicit_reference_candidates":[],"headings":[],"id":"pg70561-f366","license_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/policy/license.html","public_import_allowed":false,"record_kind":"original-editor-translator-note","review_required":["work and recension attribution","original-work chronology","Bible reference numbering and citation kind","English edition rights and attribution"],"review_status":"needs_review","rights_evidence":"Project Gutenberg metadata: Public domain in the USA. Existing 1869 English translation; translator died 1889. Electronic transcription subject to Project Gutenberg reuse terms.","source_anchor":"f366","source_ebook":70561,"source_html":"<div class=\"footnote\" id=\"f366\">\n<p class=\"c006\"><span class=\"label\"><a class=\"pginternal\" href=\"#r366\">366</a>.  </span><span lang=\"la\">Ordinatior quidem motus.</span></p>\n</div>","source_sha256":"de125e213d16053354f22b34a1c8d477ac23f201e660e4f4841b2ed7e05bb367","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/70561/pg70561-images.html#f366","text_sha256":"34763f0cb8a9cfb069f7f978ea507dc497bc1636093537342e19ac4a54cb7a04","verified":false,"work_id":null}

references: [] | work_id: | origin: existing-private-derived-record | source: https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/70561/pg70561-images.html#f366