Booxu.] ARNOBIUS ADVERSUS GENTES. 69
if you ever discuss obscure subjects, and seek to lay bare the
mysteries of nature, on the one hand you do not know the
very things which you speak of, which you affirm, which
you uphold very often with especial zeal, and that each one
defends with obstinate resistance his own suppositions as
though they were proved and ascertained [truths]. For how
can we of ourselves know whether we! perceive the truth,
even if all ages be employed in seeking out knowledge—[ we]
whom some envious power? brought forth, and formed so
ignorant and proud, that, although we know nothing at all,
we yet deceive ourselves, and are uplifted by pride and
arrogance so as to suppose ourselves possessed of knowledge?
For, to pass by divine things, and those plunged in natural
obscurity, can any man explain that which in the Phaedrus?
the well-known Socrates cannot comprehend—what man is,
or whence he is, uncertain, changeable, deceitful, manifold,
of many kinds? for what purposes he was produced? by
whose ingenuity he was devised ? what he does in the world ?
(€) why he undergoes such countless ills? whether the earth
gave life to him as to worms and mice, being affected with
decay through the action of some moisture;* or whether he
ipsi, by rejecting one word of the ms. (et qua). Canterus plausibly
combines both words into itaque—'! therefore.” LB. reads ecquid—** do
you at all," etc., with which Orelli so far agrees, that he makes the
whole sentence interrogative.
1 So restored by Stewechius; in the first ed. perspiciam (instead of
am-us) ** if I perceive the truth,” etc.
? So the Ms. very intelligibly and forcibly, res . . . invida, but the
common reading is invid-i-a—'* whom something ... with envy.” The
train of thought which is merely started here is pursued at some length
a little later.
.. $ The ws. gives fedro, but all editions, except the first, Hildebrand,
and Oehler, read PAzdone, referring, however, to a passage in the first
Alcibiades (st. p. 129), which is manifestly absurd, as in it, while Alci-
biades ‘‘cannot tell what man is,” Socrates at once proceeds to lead him
to the required knowledge by the usual dialectic. Nourry thinks that
there is a general reference to Phedr. st. p. 230,—a passage in which
Socrates says that he disregards mythological questions that he may
study himself.
* Lit., * changed with the rottenness of some moisture.” The refer-