SECT. VIII.
Concerning the supposed Liberty of the will, as opposite to all Necessity
It is chiefly insisted on by Arminians, in this controversy, as a thing most important
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and essential in human Liberty, that volitions, or the acts of the Will, are contingent events;
understanding contingence as opposite, not only to constraint, but to all Necessity. Therefore
I would particularly consider this matter.
And, First, I would inquire, whether there is or can be any such thing, as a volition which
is contingent in such a sense, as not only to come to pass without any Necessity of constraint
or co-action, but also without a Necessity of consequence, or an infallible connexion with
any thing foregoing.—Secondly, Whether, if it were so, this would at all help the cause of
Liberty.
I. I would consider whether volition is a thing that ever does or can come to pass, in
this manner, contingently.
And here it must be remembered, that it has been already shown, that nothing can ever
come to pass without a cause, or a reason, why it exists in this manner rather than another;
and the evidence of this has been particularly applied to the acts of the Will. Now if this be
so, it will demonstrably follow, that the acts of the Will are never contingent, or without
Necessity, in the sense spoken of; inasmuch as those things which have a cause, or a reason
of their existence, must be connected with their cause. This appears by the following consid-
erations.
1. For an event to have a cause and ground of its existence, and yet not to be connected
with its cause, is an inconsistence. For if the event be not connected with the cause, it is not
dependent on the cause; its existence is as it were loose from its influence, and may attend
it, or may not; it being a mere contingence, whether it follows or attends the influence of
the cause, or not: And that is the same thing as not to he dependent on it. And to say, the
event is not dependent on its cause, is absurd; it is the same thing as to say, it is not its cause,
nor the event the effect of it; for dependence on the influence of a cause is the very notion
of an effect. If there be no such relation between one thing and another, consisting in the
connexion and dependence of one thing an the influence of another, then it is certain there
is no such relation between them as is signified by the terms cause and effect. So far as an
event is dependent on a cause, and connected with it, so much causality is there in the case,
and no more. The cause does, or brings to pass, no more in any event, than is dependent
on it. If we say, the connexion and dependence is not total, but partial, and that the effect,
though it has some connexion and dependence, yet is not entirely dependent on it; that is
the same thing as to say, that not all that is in the event is an effect of that cause, but that
only part of it arises from thence, and part some other way.
2. If there are some events which are not necessarily connected with their causes, then
it will follow, that there are some things which come to pass without any cause, contrary to
SECTION VIII. Concerning the supposed Liberty of the Will, as opposite to all Necessity.
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SECTION VIII. Concerning the supposed Liberty of the Will, as opposite…