Letter XIII.
(a.d. 389.)
To Nebridius Augustin Sends Greeting.
1. I do not feel pleasure in writing of the subjects which I was wont to discuss; I am not
at liberty to write of new themes. I see that the one would not suit you, and that for the
other I have no leisure. For, since I left you, neither opportunity nor leisure has been given
me for taking up and revolving the things which we are accustomed to investigate together.
The winter nights are indeed too long, and they are not entirely spent in sleep by me; but
when I have leisure, other subjects [than those which we used to discuss] present themselves
as having a prior claim on my consideration.1464 What, then, am I to do? Am I to be to you
as one dumb, who cannot speak, or as one silent, who will not speak? Neither of these things
is desired, either by you or by me. Come, then, and bear what the end of the night succeeded
in eliciting from me during the time in which it was devoted to following out the subject of
this letter.
2. You cannot but remember that a question often agitated between us, and which kept
us agitated, breathless, and excited, was one concerning a body or kind of body, which belongs
perpetually to the soul, and which, as you recollect, is called by some its vehicle. It is manifest
that this thing, if it moves from place to place, is not cognisable by the understanding. But
whatever is not cognisable by the understanding cannot be understood. It is not, however,
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utterly impossible to form an opinion approximating to the truth concerning a thing which
is outside the province of the intellect, if it lies within the province of the senses. But when
a thing is beyond the province of the intellect and of the senses, the speculations to which
it gives rise are too baseless and trifling; and the thing of which we treat now is of this nature,
if indeed it exists. Why, then, I ask, do we not finally dismiss this unimportant question,
and with prayer to God raise ourselves to the supreme serenity of the Highest existing nature?
3. Perhaps you may here reply: “Although bodies cannot be perceived by the understand-
ing, we can perceive with the understanding many things concerning material objects; e.g.
we know that matter exists. For who will deny this, or affirm that in this we have to do with
the probable rather than the true? Thus, though matter itself lies among things probable, it
is a most indisputable truth that something like it exists in nature. Matter itself is therefore
pronounced to be an object cognisable by the senses; but the assertion of its existence is
pronounced to be a truth cognisable by the intellect, for it cannot be perceived otherwise.
And so this unknown body, about which we inquire, upon which the soul depends for its
power to move from place to place, may possibly be cognisable by senses more powerful
1464 We leave untranslated the words “quæ diffirmando sunt otio necessaria,” the text here being evidently
corrupt.
To Nebridius
537
To Nebridius