which are occasioned by desire; many others which on the other hand proceed from anger;
and none of them are of the body; but that which is not of the body is plainly intellectual.
Now1782 our definition exhibits the soul as something intellectual; so that one of two altern-
438
atives, both absurd, must emerge when we follow out this view to this end; either anger and
desire are both second souls in us, and a plurality of souls must take the place of the single
soul, or the thinking faculty in us cannot be regarded as a soul either (if they are not), the
intellectual element adhering equally to all of them and stamping them all as souls, or else
excluding every one of them equally from the specific qualities of soul.
You are quite justified, she replied, in raising this question, and it has ere this been dis-
cussed by many elsewhere; namely, what we are to think of the principle of desire and the
principle of anger within us. Are they consubstantial with the soul, inherent in the soul’s
very self from her first organization1783, or are they something different, accruing to us af-
terwards? In fact, while all equally allow that these principles are to be detected in the soul,
investigation has not yet discovered exactly what we are to think of them so as to gain some
fixed belief with regard to them. The generality of men still fluctuate in their opinions about
this, which are as erroneous as they are numerous. As for ourselves, if the Gentile philosophy,
which deals methodically with all these points, were really adequate for a demonstration, it
would certainly be superfluous to add1784 a discussion on the soul to those speculations.
But while the latter proceeded, on the subject of the soul, as far in the direction of supposed
consequences as the thinker pleased, we are not entitled to such licence, I mean that of af-
firming what we please; we make the Holy Scriptures the rule and the measure of every
tenet; we necessarily fix our eyes upon that, and approve that alone which may be made to
harmonize with the intention of those writings. We must therefore neglect the Platonic
1782 The syllogism implied in the following words is this:— The emotions are something intellectual (because
incorporeal). Therefore the emotions are soul (or souls). This conclusion is obviously false; logically, by reason
of the fallacy of “the undistributed middle”; ontologically, because it requires a false premise additional (i.e.
“everything intellectual is soul”) to make it true. Macrina directly after this piece of bad logic deprecates the use
of the syllogism. Is this accidental? It looks almost like an excuse for not going into technicalities and exposing
this fallacy, which she has detected in her opponent’s statement. Macrina actually answers as if Gregory had
urged his objection thus. “The emotions are not purely intellectual, but are conditioned by the bodily organism:
but they do belong to the expression and the substance of the soul: the soul therefore is dependent on the organism
and will perish along with it.”
1783 παρὰ τὴν πρώτην (i.e. ὥραν understood). This is the reading of all the Codd. for the faulty παρὰ τὴν
αὐτὴν of the Editions.
1784 προστιθέναι. Sifanus translates “illorum commentationi de animâ adjicere sermonem,” which Krabinger
wonders at. The Greek could certainly bear this meaning: but perhaps the other reading is better, i.e. προτιθέναι,
“to propose for consideration.”
815
On the Soul and the Resurrection.