the rupture was made: and what caused that? When and how did the mind become separated
from God?
Gregory answers this question by laying it down as a principle, that everything created
is subject to change. The Uncreate Being is changeless, but Creation, since its very beginning
was owing to a change, i.e. a calling of the non-existent into existence, is liable to alter.
Gregory deals here with angelic equally as with human nature, and with all the powers in
both, especially with the will, whose virtual freedom he assumes throughout. That, too, was
created; therefore that, too, could change.
It was possible, therefore, that, first, one of the created spirits, and, as it actually
happened, he who was entrusted with the supervision of the earth, should choose to turn
his eyes away from the Good; he thus looked at a lower good; and so began to be envious
and to have πάθη. All evil followed in a chain from this beginning; according to the principle
that the beginning of anything is the cause of all that follows in its train.
10
So the Devil fell: and the proclivity to evil was introduced into the spiritual world. Man,
however, still looked to God and was filled with blessings (this is the ‘ideal man’ of Gregory).
But as when the flame has got hold of a wick one cannot dim its light by means of the flame
itself, but only by mixing water with the oil in the wick, so the Enemy effected the weakening
of God’s blessings in man by cunningly mixing wickedness in his will, as he had mixed it in
his own. From first to last, then, evil lies in the προαίρεσις and in nothing else.
God knew what would happen and suffered it, that He might not destroy our freedom,
the inalienable heritage of reason and therefore a portion of His image in us. 13He ‘gave
scope to evil for a nobler end.’ Gregory calls it a piece of “little mindedness” to argue from
evil either the weakness or the wickedness of God.
II. His remarks on the relation between the ideal and the actual Man are very interesting.
It is usual with the other Fathers, in speaking of man’s original perfection, to take the moment
of the first man’s residence in Paradise, and to regard the whole of human nature as there
represented by the first two human beings. Gregory is far removed from this way of looking
at the matter. With him human perfection is the ‘idea’ of humanity: he sees already in the
bodily-created Adam the fallen man. The present man is not to be distinguished from that
bodily Adam; both fall below the ideal type. Gregory seems to put the Fall beyond and before
the beginning of history. ‘Under the form of narrative Moses places before us mere doc-
trine14.’ The locus classicus about the idea and the reality of human nature is On the Making
of Man, I. p. 88f. He sketches both in a masterly way. He speaks of the division of the human
race into male and female as a ‘device’ (ἐπιτέχνησις), implying that it was not the first ‘or-
ganization’ (κατασκευή). He hints that the irrational element was actually provided by the
13 On Infants’ early Deaths, III. p. 336.
14 Or. Cat. c. viii. D.
23
His General Character as a Theologian.