Chapter VIII.—Other Platonist Arguments
Considered.
Besides, it would be a harsh and absurd proceeding to
exempt anything from the class of corporeal beings, on the ground that
it is not exactly like the other constituents of that class. And where
individual creatures possess various properties, does not this variety
in works of the same class indicate the greatness of the Creator, in
making them at the same time different and yet like, amicable yet
rivals? Indeed, the philosophers themselves agree in saying that
the universe consists of harmonious oppositions, according to
Empedocles’ (theory of) friendship and enmity. Thus, then,
although corporeal essences are opposed to incorporeal ones, they yet
differ from each other in such sort as to amplify their species by
their variety, without changing their genus, remaining all alike
corporeal; contributing to God’s glory in their manifold
existence by reason of their variety; so various, by reason of their
differences; so diverse, in that some of them possess one kind of
perception, others another; some feeding on one kind of aliment, others
on another; some, again, possessing visibility, while others are
invisible; some being weighty, others light. They are in the habit of
saying that the soul must be pronounced incorporeal on this account,
because the bodies of the dead, after its departure from them, become
heavier, whereas they ought to be lighter, being deprived of the weight
of a body—since the soul is a bodily substance. But what,
says Soranus (in answer to this argument), if men should deny that the
sea is a bodily substance, because a ship out of the water becomes a
heavy and motionless mass? How much truer and stronger, then, is the
soul’s corporeal essence, which carries about the body, which
eventually assumes so great a weight with the nimblest motion! Again,
even if the soul is invisible, it is only in strict accordance with the
condition of its own corporeality, and suitably to the property of its
own essence, as well as to the nature of even those beings to which its
destiny made it to be invisible. The eyes of the owl cannot endure the
sun, whilst the eagle is so well able to face his glory, that the noble
character of its young is determined by the unblinking strength of
their gaze; while the eaglet, which turns away its eye from the
sun’s ray, is expelled from the nest as a degenerate creature! So
true is it, therefore, than to one eye an object is invisible, which
may be quite plainly seen by another,—without implying any
incorporeality in that which is not endued with an equally strong power
(of vision). The sun is indeed a bodily substance, because it is
(composed of) fire; the object, however, which the eaglet at once
admits the existence of, the owl denies, without any prejudice,
nevertheless, to the testimony of the eagle. There is the selfsame
difference in respect of the soul’s corporeality, which is
(perhaps) invisible to the flesh, but perfectly visible to the spirit.
Thus John, being “in the Spirit”
of God,
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beheld plainly the souls of the martyrs.
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Rev. i. 10
.
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Rev. vi. 9
.