Chapter 13.—Concerning the Opinion of Plato, According to Which He Defined the
Gods as Beings Entirely Good and the Friends of Virtue.
Therefore, although in many other important respects they differ from us, nevertheless
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with respect to this particular point of difference, which I have just stated, as it is one of
great moment, and the question on hand concerns it, I will first ask them to what gods they
think that sacred rites are to be performed,—to the good or to the bad, or to both the good
and the bad? But we have the opinion of Plato affirming that all the gods are good, and that
there is not one of the gods bad. It follows, therefore, that these are to be performed to the
good, for then they are performed to gods; for if they are not good, neither are they gods.
Now, if this be the case (for what else ought we to believe concerning the gods?), certainly
it explodes the opinion that the bad gods are to be propitiated by sacred rites in order that
they may not harm us, but the good gods are to be invoked in order that they may assist us.
For there are no bad gods, and it is to the good that, as they say, the due honor of such rites
is to be paid. Of what character, then, are those gods who love scenic displays, even demand-
ing that a place be given them among divine things, and that they be exhibited in their
honor? The power of these gods proves that they exist, but their liking such things proves
that they are bad. For it is well-known what Plato’s opinion was concerning scenic plays.
He thinks that the poets themselves, because they have composed songs so unworthy of the
majesty and goodness of the gods, ought to be banished from the state. Of what character,
therefore, are those gods who contend with Plato himself about those scenic plays? He does
not suffer the gods to be defamed by false crimes; the gods command those same crimes to
be celebrated in their own honor.
In fine, when they ordered these plays to be inaugurated, they not only demanded base
things, but also did cruel things, taking from Titus Latinius his son, and sending a disease
upon him because he had refused to obey them, which they removed when he had fulfilled
their commands. Plato, however, bad though they were, did not think they were to be feared;
but, holding to his opinion with the utmost firmness and constancy, does not hesitate to
remove from a well-ordered state all the sacrilegious follies of the poets, with which these
gods are delighted because they themselves are impure. But Labeo places this same Plato
(as I have mentioned already in the second book312) among the demi-gods. Now Labeo
thinks that the bad deities are to be propitiated with bloody victims, and by fasts accompanied
with the same, but the good deities with plays, and all other things which are associated with
joyfulness. How comes it, then, that the demi-god Plato so persistently dares to take away
those pleasures, because he deems them base, not from the demi-gods but from the gods,
and these the good gods? And, moreover, those very gods themselves do certainly refute
the opinion of Labeo, for they showed themselves in the case of Latinius to be not only
312 Ch. 14.
Concerning the Opinion of Plato, According to Which He Defined the Gods as Beings Entirely Good and the Friends of Virtue.
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Concerning the Opinion of Plato, According to Which He Defined the Gods…