359
For we do not, because a man has different members, break him up into many beings. But,
as the demands of reason require, we say that a single being, man, of many parts, has been
created by God. So it is necessary, if God be not separate from matter, to say that that which
is uncreated is one only; but if one shall say that He is separate, there must necessarily be
something intermediate between the two, which makes their separation evident. For it is
impossible to estimate the distance of one thing from another, unless there be something
else with which the distance between them may be compared. And this holds good, not only
as far as the instance before us, but also to any number of others. For the argument which
we advanced in the case of two uncreated things would of necessity be of equal force, were
the uncreated things granted to be three in number. For I should ask also respecting them,
whether they are separate from each other, or, on the other hand, are united each to its
neighbour. For if any one resolve to say that they are united, he will be told the same as before;
if, again, that they are separate, he will not escape the necessary existence of that which
separates them.
If, then, any one were to say that there is a third account which might fitly be given of
uncreated things, namely, that neither is God separate from matter, nor, again, are they
united as part of a whole; but that God is locally situate in matter, and matter in God, he
must be told as the consequence,2838 that if we say that God is placed in matter, we must of
necessity say that He is contained within limits, and circumscribed by matter. But then He
must, equally with matter, be carried about without order. And that He rests not, nor remains
by Himself, is a necessary result of that in which He is being carried, now this way, and now
that. And besides this, we must say that God was in worse case still.
For if matter were once without order, and He, determining to change it for the better,
put it into order, there was a time when God was in that which had no order. And I might
fairly ask this question also, whether God filled matter completely, or existed in some part
of it. For if one resolve to say that God was in some part of matter, how far smaller than
matter does he make Him; that is, if a part of it contained God altogether. But if he were to
say that He is in all of it, and is extended through the whole of matter, he must tell us how
He wrought upon it. For we must say that there was a sort of contraction of God, which
being effected, He wrought upon that from which He was withdrawn, or else that He wrought
in union with matter, without having a place of withdrawal. But if any one say that matter
is in God, there is equal need of inquiry, namely, whether it is by His being separated from
Himself, and as creatures exist in the air, by His being divided and parted for the reception
of the beings that are in Him; or whether it is locally situated, that is to say, as water in land;
for if we were to say, as in the air, we must say that God is divisible; but if, as water in
earth,—since matter was without order and arrangement, and besides, contained what was
2838 Jahn’s reading is here followed.
815
Concerning Free-Will.