completely and universally distinct. Whereas, I suppose none will deny but that choice, in
many cases, arises from nature, as truly as other events. But the connexion between acts of
choice, and their causes, according to established laws, is not so obvious. And we observe
that choice is, as it were, a new principle of motion and action, different from that established
order of things which is most obvious, and seen especially in corporeal things. The choice
also often interposes, interrupts, and alters the chain of events in these external objects, and
causes them to proceed otherwise than they would do, if let alone. Hence it is spoken of as
if it were a principle of motion entirely distinct from nature, and properly set in opposition
to it. Names being commonly given to things, according to what is most obvious, and is
suggested by what appears to the senses without reflection and research.
3. It must be observed, that in what has been explained, as signified by the name of
moral Necessity, the word Necessity is not used according to the original design and meaning
of the word: for, as was observed before, such terms, necessary, impossible, irresistible, &c.
in common speech, and their most proper sense, are always relative; having reference to
some supposable voluntary opposition or endeavour, that is insufficient. But no such oppos-
ition, or contrary will and endeavour, is supposable in the case of moral Necessity; which
is a certainty of the inclination and will itself; which does not admit of the supposition of a
will to oppose and resist it. For it is absurd, to suppose the same individual will to oppose
itself, in its present act; or the present choice to be opposite to and resisting present choice:
as absurd as it is to talk of two contrary motions, in the same moving body, at the same
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time.— And therefore the very case supposed never admits of any trial, whether an opposing
or resisting will can overcome this Necessity.
What has been said of natural and moral Necessity, may serve to explain what is intended
by natural and moral Inability. We are said to be naturally unable to do a thing, when we
cannot do it if we will, because what is most commonly called nature does not allow of it,
or because of some impeding defect or obstacle that is extrinsic to the Will; either in the
faculty of understanding, constitution of body, or external objects. Moral Inability consists
not in any of these things; but either in the want of inclination; or the strength of a contrary
inclination; or the want of sufficient motives in view, to induce and excite the act of the
Will, or the strength of apparent motives to the contrary. Or both these may be resolved
into one; and it may be said in one word, that moral Inability consists in the opposition or
want of inclination. For when a person is unable to will or choose such a thing, through a
defect of motives, or prevalence of contrary motives, it is the same thing as his being unable
through the want of an inclination, or the prevalence of a contrary inclination, in such cir-
cumstances, and under the influence of such views.
To give some instances of this moral Inability.—A woman of great honour and chastity
may have a moral Inability to prostitute herself to her slave. A child of great love and duty
to his parents, may be thus unable to kill his father. A very lascivious man, in case of certain
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SECTION IV Of the distinction of natural and moral Necessity, and Inability.…