of strong Reason do not form an even and just judgment, ‘tis for one of these two reasons:
either a liableness to Prejudice, through natural temper, or education, or circumstances; or,
for want of a great love to Truth, and of fear of Error, that shall cause a watchful circumspec-
tion, that nothing, relative to the case in question of any weight, shall escape the observation
and just estimation, to distinguish with great exactness between what is real and solid, and
what is only colour, and shadow, and words.
Persons of mean capacities may see the Reason of that, which requires a nice and exact
attention, and a long discourse, to explain—as the reason why Thunder should be so much
feared; and many other things that might be mentioned.
[16.] Consciousness is the minds’ perceiving what is in itself,—ideas, actions, passions,
and every thing that is there perceptible. It is a sort of feeling within itself. The mind feels
when it thinks; so it feels when it discerns, feels when it loves, and feels when it hates.
[69.] Memory is the identity, in some degree, of Ideas that we formerly had in our minds,
with a consciousness that we formerly had them, and a supposition that their former being
in the mind is the cause of their being in us at present. There is not only the presence of the
same ideas, that were in our minds formerly, but also, an act of the judgment, that they were
there formerly, and that judgment, not properly from proof, but from natural necessity,
arising from a Law of nature which God hath fixed.
In Memory, in mental principles, habits, and inclinations, there is something really
abiding in the mind, when there are no acts or exercises of them: much in the same manner,
as there is a chair in this room, when no mortal perceives it. For when we say, There are
chairs in this room, when none perceives it, we mean, that minds would perceive chairs
here, according to the Law of Nature in such circumstances. So when we say, A person has
these and those things, laid up in his memory, we mean, they would actually be repeated in
his mind, upon some certain occasions, according to the Law of Nature; though we cannot
describe, particularly, the Law of Nature about these mental acts, so well as we can about
other things.
[11.] Personal identity. Well might Mr. Locke say, that Identity of person consisted in
identity of consciousness; for he might have said that identity of spirit, too, consisted in the
same consciousness; for a mind or spirit is nothing else but consciousness, and what is in-
cluded in it. The same consciousness is, to all intents and purposes, individually, the very
same spirit, or substance; as much as the same particle of matter can be the same with itself,
at different times.
[72.] Identity of person is what seems never yet to have been explained. It is a mistake,
that it consists in sameness, or identity, of consciousness—if, by sameness of consciousness,
be meant, having the same ideas hereafter, that I have now, with a notion or apprehension
that I had had them before; just in the same manner as I now have the same ideas, that I
had in time past, by memory. It is possible, without doubt, in the nature of things, for God
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NO.IV. Remarks in Mental Philosophy. The Mind.