6. But it will not appear absurd if we employ another similitude to make the matter
clearer. Our eyes frequently cannot look upon the nature of the light itself—that is, upon
the substance of the sun; but when we behold his splendour or his rays pouring in, perhaps,
through windows or some small openings to admit the light, we can reflect how great is the
supply and source of the light of the body. So, in like manner. the works of Divine Providence
and the plan of this whole world are a sort of rays, as it were, of the nature of God, in com-
parison with His real substance and being. As, therefore, our understanding is unable of
itself to behold God Himself as He is, it knows the Father of the world from the beauty of
His works and the comeliness of His creatures. God, therefore, is not to be thought of as
being either a body or as existing in a body, but as an uncompounded intellectual nature,
1945 admitting within Himself no addition of any kind; so that He cannot be believed to
have within him a greater and a less, but is such that He is in all parts Μονάς, and, so to
speak, ῾Ενάς, and is the mind and source from which all intellectual nature or mind takes
its beginning. But mind, for its movements or operations, needs no physical space, nor
sensible magnitude, nor bodily shape, nor colour, nor any other of those adjuncts which
244
are the properties of body or matter. Wherefore that simple and wholly intellectual nature
1946 can admit of no delay or hesitation in its movements or operations, lest the simplicity
of the divine nature should appear to be circumscribed or in some degree hampered by such
adjuncts, and lest that which is the beginning of all things should be found composite and
differing, and that which ought to be free from all bodily intermixture, in virtue of being
the one sole species of Deity, so to speak, should prove, instead of being one, to consist of
many things. That mind, moreover, does not require space in order to carry on its move-
ments agreeably to its nature, is certain from observation of our own mind. For if the mind
abide within its own limits, and sustain no injury from any cause, it will never, from diversity
of situation, be retarded in the discharge of its functions; nor, on the other hand, does it
gain any addition or increase of mobility from the nature of particular places. And here, if
any one were to object, for example, that among those who are at sea, and tossed by its waves
the mind is considerably less vigorous than it is wont to be on land, we are to believe that
it is in this state, not from diversity of situation, but from the commotion or disturbance of
the body to which the mind is joined or attached. For it seems to be contrary to nature, as
it were, for a human body to live at sea; and for that reason it appears, by a sort of inequality
of its own, to enter upon its mental operations in a slovenly and irregular manner, and to
perform the acts of the intellect with a duller sense, in as great degree as those who on land
are prostrated with fever; with respect to whom it is certain, that if the mind do not discharge
its functions as well as before, in consequence of the attack of disease, the blame is to be laid
1945 “Simplex intellectualis natura.”
1946 “Natura illa simplex et tota mens.”
570
On God.